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SELF-DEPORTATION NATION
K-Sue Park∗
“Self-deportation” is a concept to explain the removal strategy of making life so unbearable
for a group that its members will leave a place. The term is strongly associated with recent
state and municipal attempts to “attack every aspect of an illegal alien’s life,” including
the ability to find employment and housing, drive a vehicle, make contracts, and attend
school. However, self-deportation has a longer history, one that predates and made possible
the establishment of the United States. As this Article shows, American colonists pursued
this indirect approach to remove native peoples as a prerequisite for establishing and
growing their settlements. The new nation then adopted this approach to Indian removal
and debated using self-deportation to remove freed slaves; later, states and municipalities
embraced self-deportation to keep blacks out of their jurisdictions and drive out the
Chinese. After the creation of the individual deportation system, the logic of selfdeportation began to work through the threat of direct deportation. This threat burgeoned
with Congress’s expansion of the grounds of deportability during the twentieth century
and affects the lives of an estimated 22 million unauthorized persons in the United States
today.
This Article examines the mechanics of self-deportation and tracks the policy’s
development through its application to groups unwanted as members of the American
polity. The approach works through a delegation of power to public and private entities
who create subordinating conditions for a targeted group. Governments have long used
preemption as a tool to limit the power they cede to these entities. In the United States,
this pattern of preemption establishes federal supremacy in the arena of removal:
Cyclically, courts have struck down state and municipal attempts to adopt independent
self-deportation regimes, and each time, the executive and legislative branches have
responded by building up the direct deportation system. The history of self-deportation
shows that the specific property interests driving this approach to removal shifted after
abolition, from taking control of lands to controlling labor by placing conditions upon
presence.
This Article identifies subordination as a primary mode of regulating migration in
America, which direct deportations both supplement and fuel. It highlights the role that
this approach to removal has played in producing the landscape of uneven racial
distributions of power and property that is the present context in which it works. It shows
that recognizing self-deportation and its relationship to the direct deportation system is
critical for understanding the dynamics of immigration law and policy as a whole.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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An incentive called misery.
— William Safire1
Yet for all of its influence, the Migration was so vast that, throughout
history, it has most often been consigned to the landscape, rarely the
foreground.
— Isabel Wilkerson2
INTRODUCTION
“Self-deportation” refers to an indirect method for removing from a
jurisdiction a group not desired as part of the polity.3 The term popularly attached to this removal method in 1994,4 when satire artists Lalo
Alcaraz and Esteban Zul used it in a fake press release responding to
California’s Proposition 187, which would have prohibited state-run
hospitals and schools from serving undocumented immigrants.5 Shortly
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1
2
3

William Safire, Self-Deportation?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at A15.
ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS 13 (2010).
Indirect laws are laws designed to achieve one effect that in turn produces a second effect,
which is the ultimate purpose of the law. The lawmaker who designs a self-deportation law presumes that controlling social situations through the law can engineer a person’s behavior. Professor
Hiroshi Motomura has observed that the subfederal legislation of the 2000s worked indirectly to
influence migration. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 58–59, 69–76
(2014); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Hartman Hotz Lecture, What Is “Comprehensive Immigration
Reform”? Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225, 234 (2010) [hereinafter Motomura, What Is
“Comprehensive Immigration Reform”?] (“‘[I]mmigration law’ is not just a set of laws on the books
that regulate admission and deportation. It includes a broader array of ways in which we encourage
or discourage population flows.”).
4 The term only recently came to describe the state policy that is the subject of this Article.
Before that, news media employed it occasionally and inconsistently to describe a variety of situations, including migration to the United States from Ireland in the nineteenth century, black migration out of the United States in the late nineteenth century, and the failure of a deportee to leave
the country at the prescribed time in the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Deportation Case Ruling
is Promised, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1957, at A2 (reporting on the case Heikkinen v. United States,
355 U.S. 273 (1958)); Our Foreign Population, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 28, 1883, at 4; Self
Deportation, WICHITA DAILY EAGLE, Mar. 6, 1894, at 2 (describing the departure of thirty black
people from Atlanta for Africa).
5 Robert Mackey, The Deep Comic Roots of “Self-Deportation,” N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE
(Feb. 1, 2012, 8:53 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/the-deep-comic-roots-of-selfdeportation/ [https://perma.cc/4SH5-XNW8]. In the press release, the group “Hispanics Against
Liberal Takeover” called for the creation of “Self Deportation Centers.” Id.; Lalo Alcaraz, Hispanics
for Wilson’s First Press Release Touted “Self-Deportation,” POCHO ÑEWS Y SATIRE (Jan. 31,
2012), http://pocho.com/hispanics-for-wilsons-first-press-release-touting-self-deportation/ [https://
perma.cc/D6M4-MPY4]. After Mitt Romney declared during a presidential primary debate in
2012 that “the answer is self-deportation,” see Lucy Madison, Romney on Immigration: I’m for
“Self-Deportation,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/romney-onimmigration-im-for-self-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/4H5S-M3QK], an Atlantic columnist commented that the proposal “seems like some kind of political joke taken too far.” Adam Martin,
“Self-Deportation” Really Is a Joke, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2012/02/self-deportation-really-joke/332370/ [https://perma.cc/4YWV-FZM9].
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thereafter, their fictional press contact, the “militant self-deportationist”
Daniel D. Portado, praised the law’s self-deportation strategy first in a
mock interview, and then when he appeared in real news.6 Within
months, the term made its way into public political discourse: California
Governor Pete Wilson, champion of Proposition 187, explained to New
York Times columnist William Safire that “[i]f it’s clear to you that you
cannot be employed, and that you and your family are ineligible for
services, you will self-deport.”7 In the 2000s, states and municipalities
introduced a stream of legislation8 that, often in a single bill, attempted
to make it impossible for unauthorized individuals to find shelter or employment, make contracts, or access public benefits, resident tuition
rates, and drivers’ licenses; they levied increased state-level criminal
sanctions against unauthorized persons, allowed local police officers to
enforce federal immigration laws, and otherwise targeted immigrants’
lives, such as by banning the display of foreign flags and the use of
languages other than English in public institutions.9 Legislators willingly explained that self-deportation was the purpose of the bills.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 Mackey, supra note 5; Martin, supra note 5; Ira Glass, Losers, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Nov.
8, 1996), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/41/politics/act-three [https://perma.cc/MLA2-TVPK].
7 Safire, supra note 1.
8 Between 2005 and 2007 alone, the number of such bills that states introduced grew by more
than 420% a year. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION: JANUARY 1–JUNE 30, 2008, at 1 (2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/immigreportjuly2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/HM5B-SLHE].
9 See, e.g., H.R. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9, 2011 Ala. Laws 888, 901 (contracting provisions);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.12.300–390 (2017); S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws
450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and
41); H.R. 2779, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(a) (Ariz. 2007); H.R. 1024, 86th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-205 (2016); H.R. 07-1073, 66th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2007); IDAHO CODE § 73-121 (2017); S. 70, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007); Hazleton,
Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (Sept. 12, 2006), amended by
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 (Dec. 13, 2006); and Ordinance 2007-6 (Mar. 21, 2007); Hazleton,
Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), enjoined in part by Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d
297, 300 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the ordinance’s employment and housing provisions were
preempted federal law); Frederick County, Md., Ordinance No. 12-03-598 (Feb. 22, 2012) (repealed
2015); Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., Substitute Ordinance No. BL2006-1185 (passed Feb.
6, 2007, vetoed Feb. 12, 2007); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952 (Jan. 22, 2008), invalidated by Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 2013)
(en banc); Farmers Branch, Tex., Resolution No. 2006-130 (Nov. 13, 2006) (repealed 2017); Kevin
Bouffard, Avon Park Ordinance Fails, THE LEDGER (July 25, 2006, 6:45 AM), https://
www.theledger.com/news/20060725/avon-park-ordinance-fails
[https://perma.cc/F8BB-N9MB]
(discussing the proposal and narrow defeat of an ordinance in Avon Park, Florida, called the “Illegal
Immigration Relief Act”); Vasquez v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas, MALDEF (Sept. 22, 2008),
https://www.maldef.org/2008/09/vasquez-v-city-of-farmers-branch-texas/ [https://perma.cc/T4NP58MP] (discussing litigation around three successive anti-immigrant ordinances in Farmers Branch,
Texas, beginning in 2006; the final ordinance was found preempted by federal law, Villas at
Parkside Partners, 726 F.3d at 526). In 2006, Arizona introduced a proposition to institute English
as the official language of the state alongside a proposition that would have limited access to adult
education (and therefore English classes) on the basis of citizenship status. See 2006 Ballot Propositions & Judicial Performance Review: Proposition 103, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept. 2006),
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Arizona’s S.B. 1070 in 2010 openly declared it intended “to discourage
and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens” by making “attrition through enforcement” — Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach’s
term of art for self-deportation — the law of the land.10 In 2011, when
Alabama passed H.B. 56, its sponsor, former Representative Micky
Hammon, explained the law was designed to “attack[] every aspect of an
illegal alien’s life,” and “to make it difficult for them to live here so they
will deport themselves.”11
These laws unified wildly divergent legal provisions — civil and
criminal, those involving alienage and immigration — through a single
underlying logic: they sought to make individuals into agents of the
state’s goal of their removal by making their lives unbearable.12 This
Article examines the long history of this approach to removal, and shows
that it originated during the earliest period of English colonization in
America. Although the scholarly literature on self-deportation has
focused almost exclusively on the recent subfederal legislation, the roots
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop103.htm [https://perma.cc/
PTG8-MFZF]; 2006 Ballot Propositions & Judicial Performance Review: Proposition 300, ARIZ.
SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept. 2006), https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/english/
Prop300.htm [https://perma.cc/HEQ5-8GEE]. As many politicians and reporters pointed out, the
two bills contradicted each other unless they were designed for the purpose of making life more
difficult for immigrants. See Jesse McKinley, Arizona Law Takes a Toll on Nonresident Students,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008), https://nyti.ms/2F0VFax [https://perma.cc/P3MC-47X6]. For an
analysis of how denying immigrants drivers’ licenses attacks their social and economic survival, see
Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. L. REV. 879, 887–93 (2015).
10 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41). Kobach drafted much of
this legislation and served as the architect of Romney’s self-deportation platform. Jefferson Morley,
The Man Behind Romney’s “Self-Deportation” Plan, SALON (Feb. 23, 2012, 3:44 AM), https://www.
salon.com/2012/02/22/the_man_behind_romneys_self_deportation_dreams/
[https://perma.cc/K5FM-7VVV].
11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO WAY TO LIVE: ALABAMA’S IMMIGRANT LAW 1 (2011),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1211ForUpload_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5GGWTTK]; see also Diane McWhorter, The Strange Career of Juan Crow, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2012),
https://nyti.ms/2F8MUMS [https://perma.cc/Q3EE-XD76].
12 By reading these types of provisions together, and identifying a common logic at work across
genres of laws, I claim neither that the laws serve no purposes other than self-deportation, nor that
the overlap between these genres and self-deportation law is total. I presume that people retain
agency under all manner of life-challenging circumstances and that all laws elicit a broad range of
responses. I do not aim to identify the outer limits of self-deportation policy in each situation, but
rather, its work across a range of historical circumstances, in order to discern the pattern of its
development. In reading self-deportation across genres of law, I follow Kobach’s lead: he emphasizes targeting employment (“when the jobs dry up, unauthorized aliens self-deport”), Kris W.
Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 157 (2008) [hereinafter Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement], and bringing unauthorized persons into more frequent and more onerous contact with law enforcement
(people are more likely to leave “[w]hen the risks of being detained and/or prosecuted go up dramatically”), id. at 160; see also Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and
Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 471 (2008) [hereinafter
Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law].
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of this policy lie in debates and practices that were long central to Indian
Removal and which evolved through deliberations over the fate of
emancipated slaves. Between 1827 and 1830, for example, the Georgia
legislature passed a series of “extension laws” targeting Cherokee lands
and sovereignty and, like the Arizona legislature in 2010, openly declared these laws “calculated to induce [the Indians] to remove.”13
Anticipating abolition during the Civil War, a U.S. congressman from
Pennsylvania warned that a state that did not pass legislation to keep
free blacks out would see “great swarms of fugitives — thousands and
tens of thousands of them — . . . come like black locusts, and settle
down upon us.”14 The policy then acquired new life with the establishment and growth of the modern deportation regime during the era of
Chinese Exclusion, the Mexican Removals of the Great Depression, and
beyond.15
Yet the tactic of self-deportation remains little understood. In particular, the notion that recent self-deportation laws were an unprecedented state and local effort to fill gaps left by the federal government’s
failure to enforce immigration laws is still prevalent.16 Politicians have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
13 TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL 107 (2002) (quoting ACTS
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 1829 (Milledgeville, Camak &

Ragland 1830) (alteration in original).
14 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1644 (1862).
15 In synthesizing these histories, I follow a broader project advanced by Professors Gerald
Neuman, Hiroshi Motomura, Kerry Abrams, and others who have demonstrated how immigration
law scholarship’s traditional categories and frameworks have tended to obscure the full spectrum
of laws that have controlled migration and populations they affect. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
AMERICANS IN WAITING 10–12 (2006); Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of NineteenthCentury Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2009); Motomura, What Is “Comprehensive Immigration Reform”?, supra note 3, at 234; Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American
Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1836–37 (1993). Abrams highlights
scholars’ failure to recognize the impact of indirect as well as direct laws governing immigration
and points out that many direct and indirect immigration laws historically controlled interstate
rather than “international” migration. Id. at 1355–56. Others have explored how lawyers and
courts have constructed the category of “immigrant” and “alien” to encompass Native Americans,
slaves, and free blacks for the purpose of coercing their migration. See, e.g., KUNAL M. PARKER,
MAKING FOREIGNERS 88–89 (2015); DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE
LAW 156 (2007); Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Tricky Magic: Blacks as Immigrants and the Paradox of
Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 89–107 (1999); Leti Volpp, The Indigenous as Alien, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 289, 300–15 (2015).
16 See, e.g., Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement, supra note 12, at 156 (stating that selfdeportation, or “attrition through enforcement,” “has never been the immigration strategy of the
United States”); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1445 (1995) (“The problem is
framed by the peculiar circumstance that the state has a legitimate interest in deterring ‘illegal’
aliens from residence but no power to remove them directly.”); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration
Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 82 (2013) (“Frustrated
[with Congress and the Executive], and by default, states and localities increasingly have sought to
‘cooperate’ in immigration enforcement through self-help measures.”); Benjamin D. Galloway,
Comment, Perpetual Congressional Inaction: State Regulation of Immigration in Response to Lack
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reinforced the idea that self-deportation is a recent and marginal phenomenon. When Mitt Romney declared on the 2012 presidential campaign trail that “[t]he answer [to the immigration question] is selfdeportation,”17 even members of his own party dismissed this platform
as unheard of and cruel. Newt Gingrich called it laughable for Romney
“to believe that somebody’s grandmother is going to be so cut off that
she is going to self deport. . . . He certainly shows no concern for the
humanity of people who are already here.”18 Similarly, future President
Trump attributed Romney’s loss to this position, commenting: “[h]e had
a crazy policy of self deportation which was maniacal . . . . It sounded
as bad as it was . . . .”19
In this Article, I analyze the legal phenomenon of “self-deportation.”
The oxymoronic quality of the term captures the logic by which the
strategy works: it is a variety of state-sponsored coercive removal that
assigns some agency to individuals in their own departure. Although
this term only recently came to popularly describe this phenomenon,
“self-deportation” long predates the modern era as a serious government
strategy for controlling the migration of undesired populations.20 Parts
I and II describe how American lawmakers repeatedly turned to indirect
legal strategies to pursue the mass removal of unwanted groups. Section
I.A describes how colonists who arrived to take possession of land in
America realized that they could not use direct methods to remove the
people already living there but could make them remove themselves by
using law to target every aspect of their lives. This indirect policy made
it possible for colonial officials to maintain diplomatic relations with
tribes and helped colonial settlements avoid war by distancing official
acts from the acts of private entities. However, settlers escalated conflict
with native nations in ways that threatened to undermine the twin projects of expansion and removal. Colonial officials and the British Crown
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
of Reform, 65 MERCER L. REV. 795, 826 (2014). Professor Linus Chan notes that “[p]re-emption’s
role in the S.B. 1070 litigation is unsurprising as it has been used to challenge state based immigration regulation for more than a century.” R. Linus Chan, The Right to Travel: Breaking Down the
Thousand Petty Fortresses of State Self-Deportation Laws, 34 PACE L. REV. 814, 816–17 (2014)
(citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875)).
17 Mitt Romney Talks “Self-Deportation”; More About What that Really Means, AMERICA’S
VOICE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/mitt_romney_talks_self-deportation_
more_about_what_that_really_means/ [https://perma.cc/99LC-5DLG].
18 Matthew Jaffe, Gingrich Mocks Romney’s “Self-Deportation” Policy, ABC NEWS (Jan. 25,
2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/gingrich-mocks-romneys-self-deportation-policy/
[https://perma.cc/TX9T-6E3F].
19 Kevin Robillard, Trump: “Self-Deportation” Cost Votes, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2012, 3:42 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/trump-romneys-crazy-policy-of-self-deportation-cost-votes084238 [https://perma.cc/8P29-W6S7].
20 In this Article, I refer to “migration” interchangeably with “immigration” and “emigration,”
since self-deportation policies cause interstate migration. I also address historical periods when the
usage of these terms differed from contemporary usage. Neuman, for example, writes that “nineteenthcentury usage more frequently referred to ‘emigration’ and ‘emigrants.’” Neuman, supra note 15,
at 1837 n.19.
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therefore attempted to constrain such settlers by preempting private and
unlicensed purchases of native land. Section I.B.1 illustrates how these
preemptive measures evolved into doctrine in U.S. removal policy when
courts prohibited states from legislating public discrimination. Shortly
after the courts checked the states’ attempts to create independent selfdeportation regimes, the federal legislative and executive branches exercised their supremacy in the realm of removal by undertaking the
mass deportation of tribes. Section I.B.2 explores how the nation’s experience with Indian Removal influenced its anticipation of abolition.
After abolition, the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on public discrimination also widely permitted private discrimination, which came
to perform new work, as employers increasingly turned to nonwhite
foreigners for cheap labor. Subordination, as a mechanism of removal,
became a means of regulating both migration and labor at once.
Part II shows how the influx of immigrants to meet these labor needs
sparked another round of state and local efforts to legislate public discrimination as a means of promoting self-deportation. Again, courts
found these laws preempted by federal supremacy in the realm of
removal; these laws again elicited a strong legislative and executive
response in the form of a deportation initiative — this time, the establishment of the individual deportation system during the late nineteenth
century. Section II.A analyzes the way the national removal system
evolved as the federal government developed its deportation system in
relation to self-deportation policy. Specifically, the courts have allowed
states and municipalities to increase federal direct removal capacity,
while the deportation option has allowed the legislative and executive
branches to combine direct and indirect methods and expand the range
and dynamics of federal removal techniques. Section II.B follows the
development of federal self-deportation policy through the end of the
twentieth century to the present. Once again, courts preempted discriminatory subfederal self-deportation legislation; and, once more, the federal legislative and executive branches dramatically escalated federal
deportation policy in ways that maximize its self-deportation effects. Indeed, the threat of the deportation system has grown so far beyond the
government’s ability to enforce deportation laws that now, far from obscuring its aim of removal, the public spotlight on deportations has
eclipsed the effect of the deportation system’s threat: the subordination
of deportable persons as a means of controlling their labor.
Part III describes the lessons that this history imparts for our understanding of self-deportation policy and U.S. immigration law more
broadly. It focuses on how the creation of the deportation system transformed a policy marked by distinct delegations to subfederal and private
entities, before discussing the policy’s structural limitations and costs.
The range of actors that the government depends upon to carry out selfdeportation policies includes private entities, states, and cities. States
and cities have frequently pursued the removal of unwanted populations
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by attempting to pass independent self-deportation legislation, openly
articulating tenets of a policy that otherwise tends to work in understated and nonmaximalist registers. Following colonial strategies of
preemption, courts have used the principle of preemption to affirm the
federal government’s supremacy in the realm of removal and, hence, its
coordinating role. When federal courts have checked states and cities
in this way, the legislative and executive branches have repeatedly responded to states’ and cities’ expressions of agitation with harsh national direct deportation initiatives. These developments include the
mass deportation of tribes in the 1830s, the creation of the deportation
system during the era of Chinese Exclusion, and the streamlining of deportation processes to facilitate mass removal that is ongoing now.
These repeated subfederal attempts to introduce such legislation
have occasioned an explicit conversation between state actors about selfdeportation that lies at the surface of an immigration system permeated
by the logic of the policy. Indeed, the debates over this legislation represent rare instances where policymakers have both explicitly advocated
for self-deportation and rejected it. These clear expressions notwithstanding, the phenomenon I describe below is not one characterized by
global intent. Rather, the development of self-deportation policy reflects
the outcomes of the aggregate actions of a multitude of different agents,
both public and private, whose incentives and berth of action have been
guided by institutional structures not of their making, which usually
long preceded these agents’ entry into the arena of removal. The arc of
this history furthermore reflects only the prevailing trends that have
emerged from a series of highly contested debates over national removal
policy in every instance. Though self-deportation has worked across a
range of historical circumstances, it has largely escaped assessment and
analysis, likely because its indirect design evolved from colonial policies
meant to obscure the goal of removal and thereby guard settler-tribal
diplomatic relations. The legacy of this history is an indirect system for
regulating migration that is diffuse in its operation and whose component provisions are more difficult to detect than laws that announce
their purpose of regulating migration or border crossings.21 Most operate not independently, but together and with background conditions, to
produce compounded effects, which government actors do not oversee
and thus cannot measure or record.22
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 Professors Adam Cox and Eric Posner have argued that the “second-order” question of institutional design is critically important, but often overshadowed by “first-order” questions concerning
immigration law’s substantive goals. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure
of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (2007).
22 These laws are characteristic of a legal system that governs in “disjointed and indirect modes.”
Desmond King & Robert C. Lieberman, The Civil Rights State: How the American State Develops
Itself, in THE MANY HANDS OF THE STATE 178, 194 (Kimberly J. Morgan & Ann Shola Orloff
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Far from a passing phenomenon, self-deportation forms both the fuel
and firmament of national removal policy. It has had an influence upon
life and migration in America that is both diffuse and, as Isabel Wilkerson
wrote of the Great Migration, “so vast that, throughout history, it has
most often been consigned to the landscape, rarely the foreground.”23
Its mechanism, which Safire described as “[a]n incentive called
misery,”24 now affects the lives of minority groups within a consolidated
territory, rather than communities external to one that is expanding.
Consequently, in addition to causing removal and deterring entry —
functioning as “get out” and “stay out” laws25 — self-deportation subordinates the target group. This subordination necessarily outsizes any
migration the laws can provoke, since all those who leave will suffer,
while not all those who suffer will leave.
This Article illuminates a locus of uncontrolled and hidden power in
United States immigration policy that is urgent to comprehend as selfdeportation policy enters a new stage in the twenty-first century. At a
time when policymakers’ vociferous advocacy for self-deportation is still
fresh, it is critical to honestly assess the mechanisms and major actors
of a ubiquitous mode of immigration regulation that has heretofore
largely escaped acknowledgment or examination. Without such a reckoning, the optics of self-deportation policy that make it so elusive create
conditions under which policymakers can misunderstand or disavow responsibility for the effects of their own policy.26 This analysis finally
underscores the extent to which the policy has depended on the actions
of local and private entities who help shape its target: people’s everyday
lives. Building on its observations of how the policy delegates power to
private and subfederal entities, this Article concludes by highlighting
the limitations on the government’s ability to take that power back.
I. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS OF SELF-DEPORTATION
From the early colonial period, American lawmakers contemplated
the mass removal of groups they viewed as outside their polity, including
natives, American-born black people, and nonwhite immigrants, and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
eds., 2017). Work in the field of American political development, inspired by legal realism, increasingly recognizes indirect law and policymaking as the principal mode of operation for the American
state. See, e.g., William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV.
752, 763 (2008).
23 WILKERSON, supra note 2, at 13.
24 Safire, supra note 1.
25 Chan, supra note 16, at 816.
26 In 2013, Reince Priebus, then Republican National Committee Chairman, specifically objected to the term “self-deportation,” calling Romney’s use of the word “horrific,” and added that
“[i]t’s not something that has anything to do with our party.” Aaron Blake, Priebus: Romney’s SelfDeportation Comment Was “Horrific,” WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2013), https://wapo.st/16QEhMN
[https://perma.cc/7ZCB-8JAZ].
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repeatedly considered using indirect legal strategies that targeted the
lives of these groups to remove them.27 Part I traces the development
of indirect removal strategies from the colonial period through the nineteenth century. Section I.A describes how colonists came to rely first on
indirect methods to remove native peoples, and then preemption as a
means of controlling this approach. Though the British Crown’s
attempt to similarly restrain the colonies through preemption provided
part of the impetus for independence, as section I.B.1 relates, the United
States immediately adopted identical preemptive measures to coordinate
settlers’ actions with its own. When states tested the limit of these
contraints and attempted to institute independent self-deportation policies, courts insisted on federal supremacy over removal, prompting the
executive and legislative branches to move forward with a direct deportation effort to supplement their indirect approach: the mass deportation
of tribes. Section I.B.2 shows how these dynamics in removal policy
reappeared during debates over how to remove freed slaves during the
antebellum period, culminating in abolition, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the search for new sources of cheap labor and
new forms of labor control.
A. Indian Removal in the Colonies: An Indirect
Strategy that Obscured Its Own Aim
The first two centuries of Indian Removal represent the earliest
development of indirect removal laws in America. The colonies, to some
extent, also engaged in the practice of directly removing individuals by
enforcing “poor laws,” more commonly known as laws of settlement and
removal, which provided for the removal of indigent people to their
home parishes on the public fisc. Usually, individuals were removed to
neighboring parishes, but sometimes parishes paid their fare back to
their country of origin.28 Writing about similar poor laws passed by
states during the first century of the United States, Professors Gerald
Neuman and Hidetaka Hirota have pointed out that the antecedents of the
individual deportation system lie in this history of expulsion of the poor.29
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27 In each of these examples, the consideration of indirect removal tactics reached the level of a
national conversation. While this Article focuses on the history of the development of this specific
approach to removal, in each instance the approach constituted but one of many ways — including
programs to encourage assimilation and detention or incarceration — through which governments
variously sought to manage and control these different groups.
28 See Nian-Sheng Huang, Financing Poor Relief in Colonial Boston, 8 MASS. HIST. REV. 73,
77 (2006); Howard Mackey, Social Welfare in Colonial Virginia: The Importance of the English Old
Poor Law, 36 HIST. MAG. PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH 357, 360 (1967); Howard Mackey,
The Operation of the English Old Poor Law in Colonial Virginia, 73 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
29, 38–39 (1965).
29 See HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR 9 (2017); Neuman, supra note 15, at
1846–59.
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While colonies occasionally directly deported individuals, the bulk
of removal that colonial governments sought to control and manage was
indirect. British colonists’ primary interest in North America, before
long, became the appropriation of land on a vast scale.30 As Professor
Christopher Tomlins notes, the elevation of “land over people as the
primary object of the colonizer’s attention” during the late seventeenth
century was “a peculiarity of the English” that “rearranged both the
legalities and the institutional mechanisms of colonizing accordingly.”31
The main prerequisite to colonists’ ability to take possession of lands
was the mass removal of the people who lived on them. Colonists had
no capacity to do so directly. However, they quickly realized that their
own settlement created hostile conditions that caused native peoples to
remove themselves without always being legible as an assault on tribes
that would lead them to declare war.32 Colonists therefore pursued an
indirect removal policy by passing laws and building institutions that
had the effect of attacking native peoples’ lives from every angle,
impacting their health, safety, and freedom of mobility, and their ability
to find food, shelter, and maintain kinship bonds and political orders.
Importantly, if colonists caused tribes to “self-deport,” in so doing, they
did not expel tribes from territories that were already in colonists’
possession. Rather, colonists first claimed territories as their own by
expelling tribes. Their settlement everywhere constituted encroachment.
As I describe below, the colonial period constituted an experimental
incubation period for the indirect approach of removal through settlement that, by the time of the Revolutionary War, had become a well
established and favorite tool. Where direct removal would have immediately triggered war, indirect removal methods offered the advantages
of cost efficiency and preserving settlers’ diplomatic position vis-à-vis
tribes. In 1783, General Philip Schuyler therefore advised Congress:
[A]s our settlements approach their country, [the tribes] must, from the scarcity of game, which that approach will induce to, retire farther back, and
dispose of their lands, unless they dwindle comparatively to nothing, as all

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
30 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 66–67 (1986)
(“Land speculation was everyone’s work and it affected everyone . . . . Every farmer with an extra
acre of land became a land speculator — every town proprietor, every scrambling tradesman who
could scrape together a modest sum for investment.”).
31 CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND 133 (2006).
32 Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1146 (2000). Further, comparing English colonization to Spanish colonization, Professor Eric Kades writes that “[t]he difference between the two
colonial methods was simple: the Americans engaged in widespread agricultural settlement; the
Spanish generally did not.” Id.
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savages have done . . . and thus leave us the country without the expence of
a purchase, trifling as that will probably be.33

Two months later, George Washington endorsed Schuyler’s view in a
letter:
[T]he Indians . . . will ever retreat as our Settlements advance upon them
and they will be as ready to sell, as we are to buy; That it is the cheapest as
well as the least distressing way of dealing with them, none who are
acquainted with the Nature of Indian warfare, and has ever been at the
trouble of estimating the expence of one, and comparing it with the cost of
purchasing their Lands, will hesitate to acknowledge.34

When the war ended, the new federal government worried about the
fiscal and human resources it would require to directly remove native
peoples from the lands the British surrendered to it.35 In 1789, Secretary
of War Henry Knox observed that “the finances of the United States
would not at present admit of the operation [of military conquest],”36
and opined, “it is most probable that the Indians will, by the invariable
operation of the causes which have hitherto existed in their intercourse
with the whites, be reduced to a very small number.”37 Settlement, he
reiterated, would achieve the same effect: “As the settlements of the
whites shall approach near to the Indian boundaries established by
treaties, the game will be diminished, and the lands being valuable to
the Indians only as hunting grounds, they will be willing to sell further
tracts for small considerations.”38
The legacy of this policy in the context of Indian Removal has been
obscured, however, by a public narrative that has rendered such active
decisionmaking as passive circumstance.39 In the judicial record, for
example, Chief Justice Marshall, in his infamous 1823 opinion in
Johnson v. M’Intosh,40 noted that colonial settlement had the effect of
displacing the native peoples: “As the white population advanced, that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33 Letter from General Philip Schuyler to the President of Congress (July 29, 1783) (on file with
the National Archives, Washington, D.C.).
34 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783) (on file with the Library of
Congress).
35 See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 130–32 (2005).
36 Report of Henry Knox on the Northwestern Indians (June 15, 1789), in DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 12, 12 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000). Conquering the
Wabash, Knox estimated, would require an army of at least 2500 men and sums “far exceeding the
ability of the United States to advance.” Id. at 13.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 For an in-depth analysis of this narrative phenomenon, and more specifically of the construction of “replacement narratives” in New England during the colonial period and the period of the
early Republic, see JEAN M. O’BRIEN, FIRSTING AND LASTING 55–104 (2010). For an analysis
of practices of discursive as well as material foreclosure that have characterized accounts of indigenous dispossession through the colonial economy, see K-Sue Park, Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of America, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1006 (2016).
40 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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of the Indians necessarily receded. The country in the immediate neighbourhood of agriculturists became unfit for them. The game fled into
thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed.”41
As I will show, however, the white population “advanced” only
through a mighty coordinated legislative effort by colonists to make it
impossible for indigenous communities to stay in their homelands. The
colonists’ obvious inability to forcibly remove native peoples during the
early colonial period worked in their favor by giving their claims to seek
peaceful coexistence with tribes some credibility. However, as settlers
grew in numbers, territory, and power, their increasing aggression against
tribes threatened to provoke wars and jeopardize colonies’ indirect removal and expansion projects. As a result, from the early period, colonial governments passed numerous preemption laws forbidding private
purchases of native lands in an attempt to coordinate settlers’ actions
with their own.
As a background matter, the first settlers in America found their very
arrival depopulated the lands. Wherever settlers arrived, they spread
diseases and caused epidemics with mortality rates that, because of indigenous people’s lack of immunity, frequently rose as high as eighty or
ninety percent of a village’s population.42 Early settlers found the phenomenon favorable to their colonization.43 The decimating effects of
disease allowed many settlements in New England to find their footholds without going to war with native inhabitants, or to quash burgeoning conflicts.44 Many indigenous people also “quickly learned that
the new diseases could be escaped only by casting aside family and community ties and fleeing”; in the 1640s, Roger Williams observed that
“[s]o terrible is their apprehension of an infectious disease that not only
persons, but the Houses and the whole Towne takes flight.”45 Colonists
built more than fifty early settlements on the sites of villages destroyed
and vacated by disease.46
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41
42

Id. at 590–91.
WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND 86 (1983); Alfred W. Crosby, Virgin Soil
Epidemics as a Factor in the Aboriginal Depopulation in America, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 289, 290
(1976).
43 After a devastating epidemic among the Native Americans from 1616 through 1618, Plymouth
colonists who came to settle in southern New England observed that there were “none to hinder
our possession.” NEAL SALISBURY, MANITOU AND PROVIDENCE 175 (1982); see also CRONON,
supra note 42, at 87.
44 When colonists’ presence incited a “quarrell” with the Massachusett and Pawtucket “about
their bounds of Land,” the arrival of several thousand settlers brought an epidemic that destroyed
the conflict with the tribes. SALISBURY, supra note 43, at 192.
45 CRONON, supra note 42, at 88.
46 Id. at 90. Professor John Duffy described smallpox as a “dangerous ally” that “was frequently
a decisive factor in the victories of the Europeans over the Indians.” John Duffy, Smallpox and the
Indians in the American Colonies, 25 BULL. HIST. MED. 324, 341 (1951). U.S. Army medical officer
Percy Moreau Ashburn similarly reflected that weapons, smallpox, and other eruptive fevers were
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Colonists who pursued settlement as a policy sought to facilitate
Europeans’ migration to America.47 However, as Professor Bernard
Bailyn writes, “the actual organizing, supplying, shipping, and settling
of people on the land was difficult and expensive, and hence risky.”48
For settlers, overseas migration was also costly and arduous, and settlement was fraught with risks of illness, starvation, and unnatural death.
To recruit settlers, colonial authorities therefore promised them title to
lands if they would occupy them.49 In the service of this policy, colonies
gave away so much land that Senator Thomas Hart Benton described
the thirteen colonies as having been “settled upon gratuitous donations,
or nominal sales.”50 For decades, Virginia shareholders received fifty
acres for every person they transported to the colony.51 Lord Baltimore
promised every head of a household one hundred acres for settling in
Maryland, one hundred more for bringing a wife and for each adult
servant, and fifty acres for each child under sixteen years.52 Any
adventurer who brought five men between the ages of sixteen and sixty
received 2000 acres in 1633, 1000 acres in 1635, and 50 acres for each
man in 1641.53 The Carolinas promised emigrating “undertakers” 100
acres, 50 acres for each male servant, and 30 acres for each female servant.54 Georgia offered every immigrant fifty acres,55 and Massachusetts
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
“more effective, of greater range, of surer aim than any rifle or poison gas ever devised.” P.M.
ASHBURN, THE RANKS OF DEATH: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA
81 (Frank D. Ashburn ed., 1947).
47 Professor Aziz Rana also traces “this openness to European immigration” into the period of
the early Republic. See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 116 (2010).
48 BAILYN, supra note 30, at 81.
49 These challenges to emigration and the importance of the promise of land ownership continued to be factors in settlement into the period of the early Republic, as Professor James Pfander
and Theresa Wardon observe in the context of their discussion of early U.S. naturalization policy.
See James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early
Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 365–66, 376–77 (2010).
50 1 THOMAS HART BENTON, THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW 106 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1854).
51 The Charter of 10th of Oct. 1676, in 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 532, 532 (New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823) [hereinafter
LAWS OF VIRGINIA]; Instructions to Governor Yeardley, 1618, in 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 154, 157, 164 (1894). In or around 1614, Governor Dale promised every man who brought
a family to the Virginia colony a house with four rooms and twelve fenced acres adjacent to the
house. RALPH HAMOR, A TRUE DISCOURSE OF THE PRESENT ESTATE OF VIRGINIA 19 (Richmond, Virginia State Library 1860).
52 Conditions of Plantations, 1636, in 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF MARYLAND
1636–1667, at 47, 47 (Baltimore, Maryland Historical Society 1885).
53 EUGENE IRVING MCCORMAC, WHITE SERVITUDE IN MARYLAND 13–15 (1904); Conditions of Plantations, 1636, supra note 52, at 47–48, 99–100.
54 A Declaration and Proposals to All that Will Plant in Carolina (Aug. 25, 1663), in 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 43, 45 (Raleigh, P.M. Hale 1886).
55 AN ACCOUNT SHOWING THE PROGRESS OF THE COLONY OF GEORGIA IN AMERICA,
FROM ITS FIRST ESTABLISHMENT 6 (Annapolis, Jonas Green 1741).
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Bay Company gave stockholders fifty acres for every person they
transported.56
While colonial governments were making regular overtures to tribes
to attempt to maintain diplomatic relations, they simultaneously engaged private citizens in the project of Indian Removal by linking settlers’ private incentives to their own ends. This strategy gave private
individuals an inordinately large role to play in land acquisition and
Indian Removal, which constituted a single project. Colonial officials
used legal rules to “channel[] settlement to maximize” the deleterious
effects of settlers’ everyday lives on native peoples, which included not
only spreading disease but also thinning game and destroying native
peoples’ means of subsistence.57 Laws of settlement placed conditions
on land bounties, including requirements that settlers occupy and
“improve” the lands by building on them, clearing them, planting crops,
and keeping stock, within a term of years.58 Colonists deforested the
lands to build ships, houses, and furniture and to burn firewood, thereby
exposing the soil and causing extreme temperatures, floods, and
droughts.59 English mill dams obstructed indigenous peoples’ ability to
fish. English cows and pigs ate Indian crops and grass that animals
indigenous to the territory had fed on.60 As a result of this range of
activities, indigenous people who survived disease frequently could no
longer find basic subsistence or stay in their homelands. As Professor
William Cronon has commented, “the Indians’ earlier way of interacting
with their environment became impossible.”61
Colonies also made larger grants to skilled laborers who established
businesses in powder, printing, iron works, mining, salt works, and

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN
NEW ENGLAND 43 (Boston, W. White 1853).
57 Kades, supra note 32, at 1072.
58 Amelia Clewley Ford, Colonial Precedents of Our National Land System as It Existed in
1800, 2 BULL. U. WIS. 323, 423 (1910). In Virginia, for example, within three years, settlers had to
build a house, plant one acre, and keep stock for one year, or the land would revert to the colony,
Act XVIII, An Act for Seating and Planting, in 2 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 51, at 244, 244;
later, settlers could not claim land entitlements unless they raised a crop of corn or resided on lands
for one year, 2 REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 358 (n.p., 1819). In Maine, for example, settlers had to build a house of eighteen square feet and clear five to eight acres for mowing
and tilling within three years. 2 WILLIAM D. WILLIAMSON, THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF
MAINE 180 (Hallowell, Glazier, Masters & Co. 1832).
59 CRONON, supra note 42, at 111–21 (“New England lumbering used forests as if they would
last forever.” Id. at 111.).
60 See VIRGINIA DEJOHN ANDERSON, CREATURES OF EMPIRE: HOW DOMESTIC
ANIMALS TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA 221 (2004).
61 CRONON, supra note 42, at 15. These factors led to the demise of white deer, elk, bear, lynx,
beaver, otter, foxes, martens, minks, raccoons, and muskrats in New England. Id. at 99, 101,
105–07.
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copper works.62 Colonial authorities especially rewarded settlers who
promoted and governed settlements63 and who engaged in armed combat. In general, settlers arrived armed and ready to defend the lands
they wished to claim.64 Many colonial laws required settlers to bear
arms, even at church, and forbade selling arms to natives. In 1646,
Virginia granted 100 acres to the commander at Middle Plantation, and
in 1679, it conditioned large land grants to military leaders on settling
the land with 250 men, fifty of whom were to be well armed and always
ready for conflict.65 Connecticut granted Captain John Mason 1000
acres for serving in the Pequot massacre, whose survivors fled west to
seek refuge with the Mohawks.66
Though some communities simply fled disease, colonial officials also
quickly learned that creating these new conditions made native people
more likely to sell their land. Indeed, colonists came to view this kind
of devastation as a precondition to their ability to purchase lands. In
Tomlins’s words, their purchases of native land were always “larded
with menaces.”67 As Professor Stuart Banner explains: “Repeated encroachment must have tipped Indians toward selling land they would
not have otherwise sold, as a means of obtaining some recompense for
a state of affairs they had great trouble preventing . . . . Every increase
in the English population gave the Indians more reason to sell their
land.”68 By the eighteenth century, settlers were rapidly converting native “lands into commodities transferable out of the Indian community,
creat[ing] the conditions for a vigorous land market that attracted

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
62 For example, one man, for 3000 acres, covenanted to bring twenty people from England to
Maryland who were “Artificers, Workmen, and other very useful persons.” JOHN KILTY, THE
LAND-HOLDER’S ASSISTANT, AND LAND-OFFICE GUIDE 79 (Baltimore, G. Dobin and Murphy
1808). Captain Thomas Barwick received at least 1200 acres in 1622 for bringing twenty-five shipwrights to Virginia to build houses, boats, and pinnaces. ALEXANDER BROWN, THE FIRST
REPUBLIC IN AMERICA 474 (Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1898).
63 MELVILLE EGLESTON, THE LAND SYSTEM OF THE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES 20
(Herbert B. Adams ed., Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 1886).
64 Ford, supra note 58, at 423–24 (“The policy gradually developed of using military bounties to
promote compact settlement on the frontier by men able to defend it, and in this way to secure
protection without the expense of a standing army.”). Professor Wendy Warren recently made a
similar argument by pointing out that Plymouth, like other early settlements, was a garrison. See
WENDY WARREN, NEW ENGLAND BOUND 84 (2016).
65 LYON GARDINER TYLER, WILLIAMSBURG, THE OLD COLONIAL CAPITAL 12 (1907); An
Act Enabling Major Laurence Smith and Capt. William Bird to Seate Certaine Lands at the Head
of Rappahannock and James River, in 2 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 51, at 448, 452–53.
66 See J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, 1 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF
CONNECTICUT PRIOR TO THE UNION WITH NEW HAVEN COLONY 208 (Hartford, Brown &
Parsons 1850); NEW ENGLAND HISTORICAL AND GENEALOGICAL REGISTER 345 (1943).
67 TOMLINS, supra note 31, at 151.
68 BANNER, supra note 35, at 54.
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English speculators and new English residents into the community.”69
Meanwhile, landless native people who remained within a growing settler society could find only menial work, frequently became entrapped
in debtor-creditor relationships and indentured servitude, and lost their
children to English guardians, who claimed expenses that increased native debt, forcing them to sell remaining lands to pay.70 Native people
who wished to challenge any of this faced a costly, biased, and Englishcontrolled legal system. Colonies’ Black Codes further restricted the
mobility of nonwhites, including natives, through curfews, which prohibited travel and gatherings.71
In many colonies, individuals and groups of private citizens, as well
as colonial officials, purchased lands directly from native people.
Indeed, a talent for acquiring native lands through negotiation,
purchase, or war frequently propelled individual settlers into governing
positions in the colonies.72 However, settlers’ steady encroachment onto
and dispossession of native lands generated conflicts with tribes that
both erupted into bloody wars and raised the constant threat of war.73
In an effort to reduce the instances of war, nearly every colony therefore
passed laws prohibiting trespass and waste on native lands, as well as
private purchases of native lands without official order or leave of a
court. These laws first appeared in the 1630s in Massachusetts Bay
Colony and Maryland74 and continued to proliferate through the end of
the seventeenth century.75 Some laws preempted private purchases by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
69 JEAN M. O’BRIEN, DISPOSSESSION BY DEGREES 170 (1997); see also id. at 151 (“[T]he
individualization of landownership that made a land market possible constituted the most significant structural alteration in the Indian community in the eighteenth century.”).
70 Id. at 132–33.
71 Colonies applied laws to subordinate free blacks to mixed race and native persons as well.
The examples are too numerous to list, but for a sample of such laws in several colonies, see JOHN
B. DILLON, ODDITIES OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION IN AMERICA 203–42 (Indianapolis, Robert
Douglass 1879). For a succinct description of such laws in Massachusetts Bay, see YASUHIDE
KAWASHIMA, PURITAN JUSTICE AND THE INDIAN 206–16 (1986).
72 JOHN FREDERICK MARTIN, PROFITS IN THE WILDERNESS 18 (1991).
73 For example, the Anglo-Powhatan Wars, Kieft’s War, Metacom’s War, the Susquehannock
War, the Yamasee War, Father Rale’s War, and others.
74 Mass. Bay: Law to Prohibit Unauthorized Purchase of Indian Land (Mar. 4, 1634), reprinted
in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607–1789, at 81 (Alden
T. Vaughan & Deborah A. Rosen eds., 2004) [hereinafter EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS]; Laws Concerning Indians in Code of 1648, reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra, at 102 (codifying 1634 law); Md.: Law to Regulate Land Purchases (Feb. 25–
Mar. 19, 1639), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra, at 259.
75 See, e.g., N.Y.: Law to Prevent Trespasses on Indian Lands (May 9, 1640), reprinted in 17
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 493; N.H.: Order to Regulate
Purchase of Indian Lands (Feb. 3, 1641), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 22; Plymouth: Law to Protect Indians’ Land and Timber (June 6, 1643),
reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 13; New Haven: Law
to Prohibit Unauthorized Acquisition of Land (Feb. 24, 1645), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 395; Law to Prevent Individual Purchases of Land (Jan.
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delegating purchasing power to townships and specific counties;76 as
time went on, colonies passed laws increasing the penalties for violations, in an effort to send a message to tribes as much as to settlers
themselves.77
The acceleration of land appropriation and removal in the eighteenth
century intensified settler-native conflicts and made the threat of war
omnipresent,78 spurring a concerted attempt by colonies to preempt

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4, 1640), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 393; Va.:
Law to Preserve Indian Territory (Oct. 10, 1649), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 41–42; Law to Christianize Indians and Regulate Land Sales (Mar. 10,
1656), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 47–48; Law to
Protect Indians’ Land (Nov. 25, 1652), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 74, at 43–44; Conn.: Law to Prohibit Taking Indians’ Property (Oct. 4, 1660), reprinted
in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 280; Law to Prohibit Acquisition of Indian Land for Private Use (May 14, 1663), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 282 (“[N]o person in this Colony shall buy, hire or receive as a gift
or mortgage, any parcel of land or lands of any Indian or Indians, for the future, except . . . with
the allowance of the Court.”); N.J.: Law to Acquire Land from Indians in West New Jersey (May
2–15, 1683), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 668; Law
to Require Permission to Buy Indian Lands (Sept. 8, 1683), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 668; N.H.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands
(June 1, 1687), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 227;
N.Y.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands (Oct. 23, 1684), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 530; Pa.: Law to Regulate Purchases of Land from
Indians (Mar. 10, 1683), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74,
at 733; Law to Nullify Unauthorized Land Purchases (Nov. 27, 1700), reprinted in 17 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 735.
76 See, e.g., Conn.: Law to Clarify Purchase of Indian Lands (Oct. 8–14, 1702), reprinted in 17
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 318; Va.: Law to Allow Northampton
County to Purchase Indian Lands (Nov. 20, 1654), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 46–47.
77 See, e.g., R.I.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands (Nov. 4, 1651), reprinted in 17
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 420; Law to Prohibit Unauthorized
Land Purchases (Nov. 2, 1658), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 74, at 423; Law to Prevent Illegal Purchases of Indian Land (Oct. 25, 1727), reprinted in 17
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 459; Mass. Bay: Order to Regulate
Land Purchases (June 1, 1687), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 74, at 143; Conn.: Law to Prohibit Purchase of Indian Lands (May 17, 1680), reprinted in 17
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 311; Law to Regulate Purchase of
Indian Lands (June 1, 1687), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 74, at 314; Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands (Oct. 11, 1722), reprinted in 17 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 340; N.J.: Law to Regulate Purchases of
Indian Lands (Dec. 13, 1703), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 74, at 678; N.H.: Law to Regulate Purchases of Land from Indians (May 2, 1719), reprinted in
17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 235.
78 Military leaders drew from some of the lessons of settlement. In 1763, Captain Simeon Ecuyer
famously sought to “exterminate[]” the Delawares at “one single stroke” by giving two Delaware leaders
infected blankets and handkerchiefs; a receipt initialed by top British brass noted that the purpose was
“to Convey the Smallpox to the Indians.” GREGORY EVANS DOWD, WAR UNDER HEAVEN 190
(2002); see also FRANK FENNER ET AL., SMALLPOX AND ITS ERADICATION 239 (1989).
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private purchase of native lands.79 Nonetheless, the colonies both embroiled themselves in quarrels with one another and collectively brought
settler-tribal relations to the brink of a general war. In a bid to reassert
control of the colonization effort and reassure tribes of the Crown’s good
will, King George III issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Proclamation forbade all settlement west of a boundary line drawn along the
Appalachian Mountains and preempted both private purchases and colonial officials’ power to grant lands.80
Settlers’ aggression so exposed the colonial goal of removal that it
jeopardized colonies’ relations with one another and threatened colonial
officials’ ability to maintain diplomatic ties with tribes. In other words,
private individuals’ hunger for land threatened to destroy the alignment
between private interests and official interests in maintaining control of
the territory by avoiding war. Colonies therefore preempted private
purchases of native lands in an attempt to coordinate removal policy.
The Crown — similarly wary of colonial governments’ ability to avoid
war with native nations or one another — took a similar approach with
its Proclamation. Colonists’ resounding rejection of this attempt to restrain their land acquisition, however, culminated in the Revolution,
bringing the history of removal to its next chapter. As I will show in
the next section, the model through which private citizens had sought
to recursively realize the Lockean ideal of “vacant lands” by causing
native people to remove themselves became the prototype for removal
in the new nation.81 Further, despite the unpopularity of the Proclamation, the principle of preemption both preceded and survived it to structure land and removal policy in the United States.82

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
79 See, e.g., Pa.: Law to Regulate Purchases of Land from Indians (Feb. 14, 1730), reprinted
in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 755; S.C.: Law to Prevent Purchase of Indian Lands (Dec. 18, 1739), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 74, at 295–96; Ga.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Land from Indians (Feb. 15, 1758),
reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 406; Md.: Law to
Determine Indian-English Controversies (May 1, 1756), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 339; Va.: Law to Prevent the Dispossession of Indians
(Feb. 27, 1752), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 195.
80 In the following years, Pennsylvania passed laws imposing punishments for violations of the
Proclamation that included “death without the benefit of clergy,” imprisonment, and a £500 fine.
Law to Proscribe Settlement on Indian Lands (Feb. 3, 1768), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 781; Law to Amend Prohibition Against Settling on Indian
Lands (Feb. 18, 1769), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74,
at 785.
81 See generally Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession, 46
POL. THEORY 3 (2017).
82 For a fuller elaboration of this argument, see Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763:
Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs,
69 B.U. L. REV. 329 (1989).
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B. U.S. Removal Policy During the Early Republic
Despite the outrage inspired by the Proclamation of 1763, the United
States recognized immediately after its founding the necessity of having
a mechanism for coordinating removal policy. Early on, it therefore
incorporated preemption provisions that mirrored those of the hated
Proclamation into its own land and removal policy. Before long, these
constraints provoked states to attempt to create their own independent
self-deportation regimes by legislating public discrimination. As in the
colonies, this subfederal legislation misaligned state and federal interests,
and though it drew on indirect principles — attacking every aspect of
native peoples’ lives — it made the removal aim overt and the tactic of
discrimination painfully clear. Moreover, the limited scope of these laws
promised spillover effects that risked further destabilizing interstate relations. Perhaps for all these reasons, federal courts struck this legislation down. This section examines the development of the preemption
principle in removal federalism in the context of debates about self-deportation and mass deportation in the early Republic. It shows how the
nation’s experience with Indian Removal shaped its anticipation of and
responses to abolition: the Fourteenth Amendment, for example,
codified the courts’ prohibition on public discrimination and affirmed
subordination as the purview of private citizens. Emancipation also set
the stage for the next chapter of removal history by sparking a search
for new sources of cheap labor and new ways of controlling it. Abolition
shifted the property interests driving removal policy from land acquisition to control of labor.
1. Indian Removal in the United States: The Coordinating Function
of Preemption in Self-Deportation Policy. — In its first decades, the
federal government continued to pursue Indian Removal principally
through a combination of indirect methods and outright warfare, as the
colonies had done for two centuries.83 Soon after the formation of the
United States, the federal government also asserted control over the land
market to try to keep the states from going to war with each other and
with tribes.84 It preempted the direct purchase of tribal land by any
entity other than itself, creating a centralized structure through which it
coordinated national removal policy.85 As a result, the new states could
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
83 In a trend so broad that it is not useful to single out any scholar as an example, the literature
frequently employs the term “Indian Removal” to refer to direct removals, rather than self-deportation. However, Banner presents an exception to this rule when he observes, “If the 1830s were
an era of removal, so too were the previous two centuries,” for “most of the features of U.S. government
policy that are conventionally thought to make up Indian removal were nothing new.” BANNER, supra
note 35, at 192.
84 For a detailed account of how the United States came to consolidate federal power in the area
of land policy and Indian affairs during the period of the ratification of the Constitution, see
Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1038–50 (2014).
85 Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 177 (1982)).
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not purchase lands from tribes who remained within their territorial
boundaries, nor, therefore, remove them. In theory at least, they had to
wait for the federal government to act. States’ impatience with and
challenges to the federal government’s preemptive power sparked the
first federalism disputes in the field of removal and culminated in the
only mass deportations, in a strict sense, in the nation’s history.
New circumstances in the United States whetted both the federal
and state appetites for a faster, more aggressive means of land acquisition and removal. The federal government urgently desired to take possession of the lands the British had surrendered to it under the Treaty
of Paris to pay off its considerable war debt. Meanwhile, many eastern
states had taken possession of sufficient lands that they sought to claim
total jurisdiction within their territorial boundaries.86 Federal and state
governments as well as private entities all continued to encourage settlement on native lands and, thus, ensured that private individuals
would continue to play a major role in Indian Removal. Congress made
a series of early land grants to settlers who would defend against immediate “threats,” especially along contested borders in the Mississippi,
Louisiana, Missouri, and Michigan Territories.87 Even before the war
had ended, new states including Virginia, North Carolina, and
Massachusetts adopted systems of free land grants, and states with large
backcountry regions, such as Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Wisconsin,
continued to recruit settlers from the East Coast and Europe for the next
century,88 like the federal government.89
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
86 See BANNER, supra note 35, at 147 (“Americans now wanted to obtain the Indians’ land
more quickly, too quickly for the old method of patient, parcel-by-parcel purchasing. There were
now too many emigrants to the west, and too much need for the federal revenue the land promised
to bring in, to wait for the game to be driven away.”).
87 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 34, § 2, 2 Stat. 437 (regulating grants of land in Michigan
Territory); Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 61, § 13, 2 Stat. 303 (regulating grants of land in Louisiana
Territory, present day Missouri); Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 27, § 17, 2 Stat. 229 (disposing of land in
Mississippi Territory); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 221 (giving 400 acres to individuals who
were “heads of families at Vincennes or in the Illinois country” as of 1783); Letter from President George
Washington to Congress (Dec. 23, 1790), in ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1826 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
88 EDITH ABBOTT, HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 129–32, 167–
72, 732–33 (1926) (collecting documents describing state efforts to recruit settlers).
89 In the nineteenth century, the federal government continued to pass legislation to subsidize
land and lure settlers to territory still under native control, including the Armed Occupation Act of
1842, ch. 122, 5 Stat. 502; the Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392; the Southern Homestead
Act of 1866, ch. 127, 14 Stat. 66; and the Timber Culture Act of 1873, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605. Settlers
also continued to spread disease that greatly afflicted tribes across the West. See, e.g., JEFFREY
OSTLER, THE PLAINS SIOUX AND U.S. COLONIALISM FROM LEWIS AND CLARK TO
WOUNDED KNEE 31, 33 (2004); Crosby, supra note 42, at 290–91 (describing epidemics in the
1820s and 1830s). Settler-native wars reached their height during this period, and the army used
techniques from settlement in these wars, including destroying central plains tribes’ main source of
food — the buffalo. RICHARD WHITE, “IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN”: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 219 (1991).
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While states tried to use this power by more thickly settling their
lands, and though the white and black settler population in Georgia, for
example, almost doubled between 1790 and 1800, and again from 1800
to 1820, the Creeks and Cherokees refused to leave.90 Federal officials
“discussed speeding up the process of dispossession,” but as Professor
Paul Frymer notes, for a few decades, they “remained content to move
people via individual treaties and voluntary emigration, efforts that
slowly but exhaustively removed Indian title and communities from
lands east of the Mississippi.”91 After its purchase of 530 million acres
west of the Mississippi in 1803, Congress authorized the President to
promise eastern tribes western lands if they would relinquish their
own,92 furnishing the Executive with a new removal tool that overcame
a limitation of self-deportation policy — people’s inability to leave without somewhere else to go. The government also agreed to cover
relocation costs if a tribe would agree to remove. Consequently, thousands of Cherokee moved west of the Mississippi before 1820;93 between
1817 and 1821, some Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos
agreed to ten such exchanges of western for eastern lands.94 Through
the 1820s, the government continued to apply pressure on many tribes,
many of whose members, including Oneidas, Kickapoos, Choctaws, and
Creeks, continued to cede their land to the United States.95 Still, in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
90
91

BANNER, supra note 35, at 195.
PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE 114 (2017); see also 2 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 123–24 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS] (describing Senate proceedings from 1817 regarding land exchanges with tribes); Ronald N. Satz, The Cherokee Trail of Tears: A Sesquicentennial Perspective,
73 GA. HIST. Q. 431 (1989). From 1800–1830, the federal government engaged in ninety-one transactions to purchase lands from weary tribes; between 1795 and 1838, the federal government spent
more than $80 million to purchase 419.4 million acres of land from tribes. INDIANS REMOVED
TO WEST MISSISSIPPI FROM 1789, H.R. Doc. No. 25-147 (1839).
92 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 91, at 124–25.
93 Id.; see also STANLEY W. HOIG, THE CHEROKEES AND THEIR CHIEFS 104 (1998); Letter
from Joseph McMinn, Governor, Tenn., to Daniel Graham, Sec’y of State, United States (Oct. 1,
1818), SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 1730–1842, http://neptune3.galib.
uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=GML007 [https://perma.
cc/E2ZX-6WQA]; Letter from Joseph McMinn, Governor, Tenn., to Daniel Graham, Sec’y of State,
United States (Nov. 19, 1818), SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 1730–1842,
http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=
GML011 [https://perma.cc/7VKR-BCK6]; Letter from Joseph McMinn, Governor, Tenn., to Daniel
Graham, Sec’y of State, United States (Dec. 11, 1818), SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN
DOCUMENTS 1730–1842, http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=
7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=GML010 [https://perma.cc/4P8W-9Q4U] (also available at the Tennessee
State Library and Archives, Governor McMinn Letters, Box 10, folder 53).
94 BANNER, supra note 35, at 194.
95 See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, Jan. 18, 1821, 7 Stat. 215; MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL 69–141 (1982) (describing the experiences of the Creeks during this
time period); Creek Indians, 22 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 223 (1824); Letter from Duncan
Campbell and James Meriwether, Comm’rs, United States, to Creek Chiefs (Dec. 9, 1824),
SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 1730–1842, http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/
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1825, the War Department estimated that nearly 54,000 native people,
including Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks, continued to live within the
boundaries of Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and New
York.96 The Cherokees still held 5.3 million acres of fertile land in Georgia and over a million in Tennessee, while the Creeks held well over 4
million in Georgia and the Choctaw and the Chickasaw held over 15.7
million in Mississippi.97
In the late 1820s, impatient southeastern states responded to what
they perceived as federal inaction with respect to the issue of Indian
Removal. Presaging the subfederal self-deportation legislation of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, they began to pass legislation that
asserted states’ rights to initiate indirect removal processes.98 The
Georgia legislature led this effort with a series of “extension laws” that
sought to subordinate the Cherokee and establish jurisdiction over all
the lands within the state’s boundaries. First, in 1827, Georgia assigned
Cherokee land to various Georgia counties, denying Cherokee sovereignty and subjecting Cherokees to the state’s jurisdiction and laws. In
1828, it formally declared Cherokee laws void within the state. In 1830,
it first authorized the state to take possession of all Cherokee gold, silver,
and other mines, and then to seize all Cherokee land and distribute it to
white settlers. It made it illegal for Cherokees to assemble for any purpose and voided contracts into which they entered.99 Governor George
Gilmer acknowledged these laws “were produced for the sole purpose of
making life so miserable for the Cherokees that they would be forced to
remove,” privately echoing the purpose the legislature had openly declared in 1829.100 Secretary of War John Eaton argued the laws were
“legitimate powers which attach, and belong to [the states’] sovereign
character.”101
Despite technically deploying indirect strategies of removal by
attacking Cherokee lives, the extension laws’ explicit goals of removal
and control of Cherokee lands raised the public debate over this indirect
policy to a feverish pitch. A famous legal battle ensued in which the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=tcc008 [https://perma.cc/K5CXXSZY] (also available at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia
Libraries, Telamon Cuyler collection, Box 77, folder 33).
96 1 Reg. Deb. app. 63 (1825).
97 Id. at app. 61.
98 As Banner comments, “[i]t was only a matter of time before frontier state governments, answerable to white settlers bordering on Indian land, began ratcheting up the pressure on the nonselling tribes by threatening to make life considerably more difficult for Indians who refused to sell
their land.” BANNER, supra note 35, at 213.
99 BANNER, supra note 35, at 201; see also FRYMER, supra note 91, at 116 (describing a January
1828 Georgia resolution asserting title over tribal land within its state boundaries).
100 GARRISON, supra note 13, at 107.
101 Letter from John H. Eaton, Sec’y of War, United States, to Cherokee Delegation (Apr. 18,
1829), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 36, at 44, 46.
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Supreme Court ultimately rejected these overt self-deportation laws and
refused to allow states to legislate public discrimination in this way.102
Although the Court affirmed inherent tribal sovereignty in Worcester v.
Georgia103 by asserting the federal government’s supremacy in the realm
of Indian Affairs, the Court also guaranteed the government’s prerogative to coordinate the national removal effort.104 Further, the other
branches of the federal government generally acquiesced in the southeastern states’ informal refusal to abide by the Court’s holding limiting
their jurisdiction in Worcester. Because these states’ courts went on to
assert their jurisdiction in dozens of criminal cases with Indian
defendants, Professor Tim Garrison concludes that state supreme courts
effectively “displaced the Supreme Court’s decision,” making “southern
removal ideology . . . the law of the land.”105 Observing the effects of
federal and state nonenforcement, Professor Deborah Rosen comments
that “[t]he federal government and the state governments shared an end
goal, and they acted in tandem to achieve that goal”106: “control of Indians and Indian lands.”107
This convergence between state and federal interests came into stark
relief in the federal government’s choice to exercise its supremacy in this
realm to pursue a mass deportation plan. After the election of Andrew
Jackson, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act of 1830,108 which
appropriated $500,000 for the direct removal of tribes.109 This Act, by
making the threat of mass deportation imminent,110 had immediate indirect effects: its passage spurred more tribes to enter into treaties to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
102 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). In 1831, the Supreme Court punted on
deciding the constitutionality of Georgia’s extension laws, but by declining jurisdiction, it limited
Cherokee sovereignty by declaring the Cherokee Nation a “domestic dependent nation[]” rather
than a “foreign state[].” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1831). By describing
the tribe’s relationship to the United States as that of a “ward to his guardian,” the Court reinforced
the idea of a trust relationship between tribes and the federal government. Id. at 17. Chief Justice
Marshall’s famous decisions “conceived a model that can be described broadly as calling for largely
autonomous tribal governments subject to an overriding federal authority but essentially free of
state control.” CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 24 (1987). For a concise summary
of the significance of these cases, see Angela Riley, The History of Native American Lands and the
Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 369, 372–73 (2013).
103 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
104 Id. at 519–20.
105 GARRISON, supra note 13, at 229.
106 ROSEN, supra note 15, at 78.
107 Id. at 78–79.
108 Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
109 Id. at 412.
110 BANNER, supra note 35, at 191–93, 227 (“[R]emoval was going on long before the so-called
era of removal, and it would go on long afterward.” Id. at 227.); see also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
THE GREAT FATHER 244 (1984) (“Nor was the relation of the United States with these groups in
the 1830s, after the passage of the Removal Act, a new departure. Rather, it was a continuation of

2019]

SELF-DEPORTATION NATION

1903

exchange their lands, beginning with the Choctaw in 1830.111 Still, the
Cherokee refused to leave, and in 1835, U.S. statesmen negotiated and
ratified with a minority coalition a treaty requiring the tribe to depart,
though Cherokee leaders objected that the treaty was fraudulent.112
In March 1836, more than two-thirds of the peoples targeted for removal remained on their lands.113 President Jackson authorized 10,000
volunteer troops to deport them,114 and in 1838, the U.S. Army interned
the Cherokee in Georgia in forts to await mass expulsion.115 The War
Department, woefully and predictably short on funds, allowed Georgia
to assist with the deportation effort by directing the troops and
requested an additional $1.1 million from Congress.116 The mass deportation of over 18,000 Cherokee across several hundred miles was an
administrative and humanitarian disaster. Between 4000 and 8000
Cherokee died. Many more suffered from dysentery, cholera, malnutrition, and exposure as they walked across the frozen ground and the
Mississippi river.117
Beyond rooting the removal system in indirect strategies, Indian
Removal also served as a testing ground through which the U.S. government developed a coordinated indirect removal policy and flexed its
newfound power to experiment with direct mass removal. Critically, it
coordinated its own removal efforts with those of states by prohibiting
states from legislating public discrimination. By permitting states to
continue recruiting settlers who would engage in hostilities and
discrimination on the ground, however, the federal government continued to delegate the work of subordination to the private sphere instead.
From its evolving seat of power, it further undertook the mass deportation of eastern tribes and, there, allowed states to play a supporting role.
This decision highlights an important limitation of self-deportation
strategy: while potent enough to have facilitated the establishment of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
policies and actions that had been going on for more than three decades (although without doubt
new impetus was given by the 1830 legislation).”).
111 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit (Sept. 27, 1830), in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES
310–15 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904).
112 Carl J. Vipperman, The Bungled Treaty of New Echota: The Failure of Cherokee Removal,
1836–1838, 73 GA. HIST. Q. 540, 544–45 (1989).
113 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 119–20.
114 Letter from Lewis Cass, Sec’y of War, United States, to C.C. Clay, Governor, Ala. (Apr. 15,
1836), in REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1838).
115 BANNER, supra note 35, at 224.
116 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 122. In 1828, the Indian Affairs Committee had informed the
Secretary of War of the “enormous” costs of deporting 800 of the Creeks west. Letter from Thos.
L. McKenney, Superintendent, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to James Barbour, Sec’y of War (Jan. 4,
1828), as reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 44, at 5–6 (1828).
117 BANNER, supra note 35, at 225; FRYMER, supra note 91, at 119; ROSEN, supra note 15, at
46; Satz, supra note 91, at 431; see Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian Removal,
50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49 (2008–2010).
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the United States, the policy left the government with little control over
removal and no ability to force final land cessions from tribes.118 In a
catastrophic experiment that it would not repeat, the federal government therefore used direct removal methods to supplement and fill in
the gaps of its indirect policy of self-deportation, rather than the reverse.
2. Black Colonization Plans and Their Aftermath: Subordination as
the Domain of the Private Sphere in Self-Deportation Policy. — The
more land colonists sought, the more they relied upon the African slave
trade to procure labor that would give productive value to the lands
they expropriated. From an early period, therefore, the growing number
of civic and racial outsiders in colonial society concerned white settlers,
who considered mass deporting the increasing numbers of free blacks in
colonial society.119 After the establishment of the United States, the
specter of abolition only intensified these debates.120 Legislators
brought their experience with Indian Removal to bear on their debates
over the options of mass deporting and self-deporting emancipated
slaves.121 Indeed, the expense and logistical difficulties of mass deportation in Indian Removal perhaps explain why a national “black
colonization” effort, as these mass deportation plans were called, never
came to pass. Consistent with its anticipation of abolition, the nation’s
experience with removal marked the developments that followed it.
Perhaps most importantly, the government consecrated the prohibition
on public discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment while sanctioning private discrimination. This new federal constraint sparked conflict
with southern states, which sought immediately to legally subordinate
free blacks. It also paved the way for indirect removal policy — with
its heavy structural reliance on private discrimination — to answer the
post–Civil War need for new methods of controlling new sources of
cheap, increasingly foreign labor.
Between 1770 and 1810, most statesmen opposed slavery for various
reasons. But they would not seriously consider emancipation because
they could not imagine integrating blacks into the national polity. White
northerners wished to ensure that blacks would stay in the South, and
white southerners would not contemplate civic equality. These factors,
together with the daunting expense and logistics of a mass expulsion,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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119

FRYMER, supra note 91, at 114.
In 1691, for example, Virginia enacted a law forbidding further emancipation of slaves unless
the owner provided for their transportation beyond the limits of the colony within six months of
the manumission date. An Act for Suppressing Outlying Slaves, in 3 LAWS OF VIRGINIA 87–88
(Philadelphia, n.p. 1823).
120 H.N. Sherwood, Early Negro Deportation Projects, 2 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 484, 494 (1916).
121 Long before Kobach described self-deportation and mass deportation as alternative removal
methods, legislators compared them in terms of cost and feasibility. Kobach argued for selfdeportation as a third option alongside the choices of “attempt[ing] to round them up and remove them
all, or grant[ing] a massive amnesty.” Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement, supra note 12, at 155.
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long stymied efforts during the early Republic to imagine a concrete end
to slavery.122 In 1790, the black population of Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia comprised between 36% and 44% of the total population.123 In many counties and
districts, blacks outnumbered whites. During the constitutional ratification process, James Galloway of North Carolina had commented that
“[i]t is impossible for us to be happy, if, after manumission, they are to
stay among us.”124
States and statesmen therefore long deliberated over the individual125
and mass deportation of free blacks. In particular, the question of where
to send deportees preoccupied proponents of black colonization plans,
but to no resolution. As President, Thomas Jefferson considered but
rejected western lands in the United States, the West Indies, Santo
Domingo, and Sierra Leone as destinations for both black and Indian
deportees.126 More than a dozen state and local legislatures pleaded
with Congress for aid for black colonization in 1827 and 1828, but
Senate Committee members worried that “taking land in Africa required
a new conquest unlike the manner by which the United States extinguished Indian lands” and estimated that the costs of transportation
alone would amount to more than $28 million.127 Legislators from
Delaware described mass deportation as “essential to our safety” and a
“necessity of self-defense.”128 As Frymer recounts, Maryland allocated
$200,000 for mass deportation in 1832, authorized the establishment of
a colony at Cape Palmas, and later offered blacks free passage to Liberia
or Trinidad.129 Indeed, Frederick Douglass remarked that “almost every
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
122

Civil rights attorney Don B. Kates, Jr. sought to explain the conundrum they faced as follows:
How could any ‘responsible’ person — where ‘responsible’ connotes fundamental agreement in the basic structure of American society and politics — look with equanimity on
the accretion to the political and social population of an immense Negro mass, alien to the
body politic, whose unarticulated aspirations might pursue any direction under any leaders. If emancipation and integration would inevitably overthrow the political status quo
then they were unacceptable. For Northerners the clinching argument was not only that
the political balance of the nation would be overthrown in the South, but that only slavery
and its attendant restrictions on Negro movement kept Negroes in the South.
Don B. Kates, Jr., Abolition, Deportation, Integration: Attitudes Toward Slavery in the Early
Republic, 53 J. NEGRO HIST. 33, 38–39 (1968).
123 DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, NEGRO POPULATION 1790–1915, at 45
(1918).
124 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
COSNTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1907).
125 See PARKER, supra note 15, at 97–99.
126 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 227, 230–31 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA 149; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Nov. 24, 1801); Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Governor Page (Dec. 27, 1804)).
127 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 232.
128 Id. at 229.
129 Id. at 230 (citing Cuban Affairs-Colored Emigration-Political Business, N.Y. DAILY TRIB.
(Sept. 5, 1851); WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION 191 (1990)).
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respectable man” in the north was in favor of black colonization.130 By
the 1840s, Frymer tells us, eleven northern state legislatures had formally endorsed black colonization.131
Meanwhile, Southern politicians vehemently opposed abolition and
black colonization together, viewing the latter as an attack on slavery.
Publically, many opposed such plans on the grounds of cost and logistical impossibility. Patrick Henry, for example, lamented that “to re-export them is impracticable, and sorry I am for it.”132 Virginia
abolitionist Judge St. George Tucker believed that a “marked physical
and intellectual inferiority” required the removal of blacks after emancipation, but “heaped scorn” on plans calling for “deportation at government expense.”133 The cost would be prohibitive, he argued; if Virginia
suffered from the tax burden of providing for three or four thousand
soldiers in the west during the Revolution, how could it possibly pay to
deport 305,000 freedmen in Virginia, or the 800,000 freedmen in all the
slaveholding states?134 Tucker therefore proposed Virginia use a selfdeportation strategy instead, to achieve the outcome of removal without
the expense of deportation: the state should, “by denying them those
privileges here which they might hope to acquire elsewhere, endeavour
to prompt them to migrate from hence.”135 Practically, this plan meant
laws that would disarm blacks and exclude them from office; and “by
incapacitating them from holding lands, we should add one inducement
more to emigration and effectually remove the foundation of ambition,
and party struggle.”136 “Under such an arrangement,” he mused, “we
might reasonably hope, that time would remove from us a race of men,
whom we wish not to incorporate with us, which now form an obstacle
to such incorporation.”137
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
130 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 221. Southern legislators blocked national legislative efforts to
promote and fund colonization. In response, many prominent statesmen, including Supreme Court
Justice Bushrod Washington, James Madison, Henry Clay, Chief Justice John Marshall, Daniel
Webster, and Rufus King helped found or joined the American Colonization Society in 1816 to
advocate for black colonization using state and private channels. Id. at 228.
131 Id. at 229.
132 WILLIAM W. HENRY, 1 PATRICK HENRY 114 (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1891).
133 Kates, supra note 122, at 42.
134 Sherwood, supra note 120, at 487–88. Massachusetts Governor James Sullivan agreed that
the federal treasury could not bear the expense of any mass exportation. Id.; see also St. George
Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 2 BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCES app. 31 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch &
Abraham Small 1803); Kates, supra note 122, at 41–42.
135 3 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 421 (Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society 1792).
136 Id. at 421; Sherwood, supra note 120, at 488.
137 Sherwood, supra note 120, at 488; 3 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY, supra note 135, at 421. Tucker’s plan for the gradual emancipation of slaves in
Virginia was submitted to the state assembly. 3 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
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As nationwide emancipation loomed closer, the challenges of directly
removing more than four million African Americans concretized the
untenability of their mass deportation.138 As late as 1862, President
Abraham Lincoln urged Congress to adopt a colonization plan and acquire the territory to carry it out.139 Many northern states had already
passed explicit “stay out” laws.140 As early as 1848, Illinois prohibited
“Negro immigration” entirely in its constitution,141 and Oregon,
California, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa also passed constitutions prohibiting the settlement of blacks.142 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Indiana, and Ohio all enacted legislation making it practically
impossible for free blacks to live within their boundaries.143 Virtually
all northern states embraced self-deportation policies of the “stay out”
variety at this time.
White southerners, for their part, responded to abolition and the failure of black colonization by seeking new means of legally subordinating
the free black population. Almost immediately, southern states began
to pass Black Codes that targeted every aspect of black people’s lives to
differentiate them from whites144 and attempt to control black people’s
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, supra note 135, at 421; ST. GEORGE TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY 93–94 (Philadelphia, n.p. 1796).
138 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 222–25, 255. Frymer also suggests that Indian Removal left a
strong structure of advocacy opposed to removal in general. Id. at 260 (comparing the failure of
black colonization to “the greater ‘success’ of Indian removal decades earlier in removing just under
100,000 people”).
139 Abraham Lincoln, First Annual Message, in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1908, at 44, 54 (James D. Richardson ed., 1908).
140 Neuman, supra note 15, at 1866–73 (discussing states’ efforts to restrict the migration of free
blacks and analyzing these efforts as immigration law history).
141 JAMES R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE 23 (1989).
142 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 236. Efforts to do so in Michigan, Pennyslvania, Ohio, and New
Jersey were narrowly defeated. See id. at 236–37.
143 Pennsylvania left a legislative loophole allowing blacks to be sold south to avoid manumission
in the state, while Rhode Island prohibited the importation of slaves and free blacks alike. Kates,
supra note 122, at 42 n.24; see also FRANK U. QUILLIN, THE COLOR LINE IN OHIO 21–34 (1913);
Simeon F. Moss, The Persistence of Slavery and Involuntary Servitude in a Free State (1685–1866),
35 J. NEGRO HIST. 289, 308 (1950).
144 The Codes imposed poll taxes and barred blacks’ access to courts, poor relief, orphanages,
parks, schools, and other public facilities. See Daniel Jay Whitener, Public Education in North
Carolina During Reconstruction, 1865–1876, in ESSAYS IN SOUTHERN HISTORY 67–73 (Fletcher
Melvin Green ed., 1949); LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-6, at
192–97, 218–19 (2d Sess. 1867) (concerning “reports of the assistant commissioners of freedmen, and
a synopsis of laws respecting persons of color in the late slave States”). They further criminalized
hunting, fishing, and freely grazing livestock, making it impossible for landless individuals to own
livestock at all. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 203 (1988); LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN
THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 203, 319–22 (1979). Apprenticeship laws
allowed judges to send individuals over sixteen and children under the care of parents into bondage,
without their parents’ knowledge or permission, replicating one of the cruelest aspects of slavery —
subordinating kinship bonds to a white master’s whim. Id. at 365–66.
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labor through employment laws, criminal laws,145 and the vast expansion of the convict lease system and public works projects.146 The federal government responded to these laws and their bald attempts to undermine the outcome of the war by asserting federal prerogative to
prohibit such public discrimination, now to protect the formal equality
of all U.S. citizens. Congress first asserted this prohibition by passing
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over President Andrew Johnson’s veto,147
and then enshrined the principle in the Fourteenth Amendment.148 The
Fourteenth Amendment importantly prohibited states from abridging
the “privileges or immunities” of U.S. citizens or depriving them of due
process and equal protection of the laws.149 This emphasis on official
action and general permission of private discrimination eventually hardened into the famous state action doctrine, according to which the
Constitution does not tolerate discrimination committed by a
government entity, but places no prohibition on discrimination by
private citizens.150
This federal constraint sparked new conflicts between the federal
government and the states whose power it checked. Reconstruction
efforts went into demise after the federal commitment to protect them
ended with President Rutherford Hayes’s pledge to respect “local
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
145 Employment laws required people to obtain year-long contracts to prove their employment
status; laborers who left their jobs before the expiration of a contract forfeited wages already earned;
sharecropping contracts were enforced criminally, rather than civilly; and anyone offering work to
a laborer already under contract risked imprisonment or a $500 fine. FONER, supra note 144, at
199. As under slavery, black people could not rent land in urban areas, were subject to arrest by
any white citizen, and faced criminal charges for vague offenses, including “vagrancy,” “insulting”
gestures or language, “malicious mischief,” and preaching without a license. Id. at 198 (citing
WILLIAM C. HARRIS, PRESIDENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION 99–100, 112–15, 130–31 (1907); S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-6, supra note 144).
146 FONER, supra note 144, at 205.
147 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012)).
148 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
149 Id. Professor Gerard Magliocca has also posited that Cherokee Removal influenced the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. He shows that Representative John Bingham, who authored
most of Section 1, both explicitly intended to make the Bill of Rights binding upon states, and
referred to Georgia’s actions at issue in Worcester v. Georgia to describe the protections the Section
would provide. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53
DUKE L.J. 875, 929–32 (2003).
150 Professor Pamela Brandwein has demonstrated that for a few decades after the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, early interpretations preserved the possibility that the federal government could punish private individuals for race-based wrongs through either a Fifteenth
Amendment exemption to the state action doctrine or the theory of “state neglect,” under which
individuals’ actions gained “the color of law . . . or custom” through states’ failure to enforce the
laws when whites violated them against blacks. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 13 (2011). The “state neglect” doctrine therefore represents another variant of the prohibition on public discrimination, which recognizes that
states can discriminate through negative as well as affirmative acts, namely, through the failure to
enforce their laws equally as shown by race-based patterns. See id.
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autonomy” and withdrawal of federal troops from the south in 1877.151
By around 1890, this practical federal abdication had plunged the South
into the era of Jim Crow. States began once more to pass contractenforcement and vagrancy laws, as well as laws restricting the activities
of labor recruiters,152 expanding the convict-lease system,153 imposing
poll taxes and literacy tests to suppress the black vote, mandating
segregation in railway travel, and increasing racial disparities in
educational funding.154 In addition to passing public laws of subordination, the South also pursued the same results through private discrimination and law enforcement patterns: the sharecropping system and
debt-cycles also worked to entrap and subordinate blacks; and while
white police forces, state militias, and judicial systems enforced Jim
Crow laws, their failure to enforce other laws allowed racial terror to
grow to such proportions that people referred to this aspect of the subordination regime as an independent, extrajudicial order — “lynch
law.”155 As a result, black migration out of the South increased dramatically in the 1890s, and about 185,000 people went North that decade.156
Private discrimination in the North, freshly sanctioned, continued to
limit the possibility of black migration there, however. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sundown towns, where white citizens committed collectively to maintaining the racial homogeneity of
their jurisdictions, were steadily increasing across the North and
West.157 In urban centers, too, private employers widely refused to hire
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
151 Andrew Buttaro, The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and the End of Reconstruction, 47 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 135, 161–162 (2015). Almost 10,000 people from Kentucky and Tennessee settled in
Kansas during the 1870s, and more than 6000 Texans, Mississippians, and Louisianians followed
in the “Kansas Fever Exodus” in 1879 and 1880 during the bloody aftermath of the collapse of
Reconstruction. GROSSMAN, supra note 141, at 23–24. Emmett J. Scott writes that “[t]he real
causes of the migration of 1879 were not far to seek. . . . [B]y far the most potent factor in effecting
the movement was the treatment received by negroes at the hands of the South.” EMMETT J.
SCOTT, NEGRO MIGRATION DURING THE WAR 3 (1920).
152 Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163–64 (1984) (discussing the “labor cartel” effects under Jim Crow).
153 H.R. EXEC. DOC NO. 49-1, pt. 5, at 1–6 (1886); TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF LABOR: CONVICT LABOR, H.R. REP. NO. 59-906, at 230–70 (1906).
154 MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 10–11 (2004).
155 As southern states sank under intensifying Jim Crow regimes, more than 7000 blacks
participated in the 1889 Oklahoma land rush, and approximately 100,000 more followed during the
next two decades, to establish approximately twenty-five black towns in that state. GROSSMAN,
supra note 141, at 24–25.
156 Id. at 32. For analyses comparing Jim Crow laws with contemporary self-deportation laws,
see Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the “New” Birmingham the Same as the
“Old” Birmingham?, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 377–78 (2013); Karla Mari McKanders,
Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163 (2010).
157 JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS 25, 80–84 (2005). Small communities of blacks
lived in urban areas in the North, including Boston, Philadelphia, and New York. VANESSA H.
MAY, UNPROTECTED LABOR 4 (2011).
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black people, producing “the very hard fact that, though the North
afforded larger privileges, it would not support negroes.”158 In a testament to the force of private discrimination, black migration north remained low until the outbreak of World War I abruptly halted European
immigration to the country.159 Northern factory owners who faced labor
shortages just as they stood to gain spectacular profits from war mobilization then opened their doors to women and blacks in large numbers
for the first time, triggering the mass exodus from the South known as
the Great Migration.160 As one Mississippian explained, “[b]efore the
North opened up with work all we could do was move from one plantation to another in hope of finding something better.”161
Jim Crow was not a self-deportation regime. This public regime of
subordination, rather, was designed to hold black labor captive in the
South. The Great Migration nevertheless reveals the structural similitude of subordination regimes intended to control labor and to cause
removal, and the way a single regime can achieve both. It also exposed
the external, background conditions that southerners had taken for
granted in designing the labor control regime of Jim Crow — namely,
the prevalence of self-deportation policies in the North and the intransigence of northern private discrimination. By banking on black people
having nowhere else to go, southern lawmakers believed they could
maintain the population as a source of cheap labor with little recourse
to the law. However, by using the tool of private discrimination as a
lever, northern employers activated the logic of relativity inherent in
subordination to show that better options elsewhere could convert a system designed to entrap people into one that functioned to drive them
out.162 Against the backdrop of “stay out” public regimes of discrimination in the North, the Great Migration underscored the power of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
158 SCOTT, supra note 151, at 16–17. As Scott writes, though most southern black people wished
“to escape from the oppressive social system of their section,” “not until fifty years after the privilege
was granted negroes to go where they pleased did they begin to make a sudden rush for the northern
states.” Id. at 16. In the words of a black church elder in Macon, Georgia, when new employment
opportunities appeared, the “unjust treatments enacted daily on the streets, street cars and
trains . . . [began to drive] the Negro from the South.” GROSSMAN, supra note 141, at 17; see also
Charles S. Johnson, The New Frontage on American Life, in THE NEW NEGRO 280 (Alan Locke
ed., 1925) (describing oppression in the South as the “soil” that bred the impulse to leave). Professor
James R. Grossman cautions, however, against trying to separate out “push” and “pull” factors that
drove the Great Migration, or to artificially distinguish “economic” and “social” factors. See
GROSSMAN, supra note 141, at 14. In 1918, Carter G. Woodson argued it was unclear whether
blacks would have fled the South and its oppression if given an alternative before, or if they would
have stayed in the South in spite of new jobs in the North had they been treated “as men.” CARTER
G. WOODSON, A CENTURY OF NEGRO MIGRATION 169 (1918).
159 LOEWEN, supra note 157, at 58.
160 Id.
161 GROSSMAN, supra note 141, at 18.
162 One observer wrote in 1917 that a group of migrants leaving Louisiana were “willing to run
any risk to get where they might breathe freer.” W.E.B. DuBois, The Migration of Negroes, 14
CRISIS 63, 66 (1917).
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contrasting levels of private discrimination to influence migration by
creating the conditions for a group’s life possibilities in a place.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s constraint on state power elevated
longstanding and pervasive discrimination in the private sphere to a
constitutional principle. This national institutionalization of the public
and private roles in subordination held significant meaning for removal
policy at a moment when abolition had propelled the nation into a
search for new sources of cheap labor and new methods of labor control.
As employers increasingly turned toward nonwhite foreigners for cheap
labor, the increasing presence of these populations in the country incited
the demand for their removal. Meanwhile, Jim Crow’s use of subordination to control labor accented the extent to which removal strategies
relied on private discrimination. This structural homology suggested
that, within a territory newly consolidated and under U.S. control, the
approach of attacking immigrants’ lives could accomplish both labor
control and removal. Consequently, as the next Part explores, indirect
removal strategies that had long been used to accumulate property in
land now became a method of controlling foreign labor, while the subordination that had long been their mechanism became another end of
the policy in itself.
II. THE RISE OF THE MODERN REMOVAL SYSTEM
Part II describes how the advent of the federal individual deportation system renovated the removal system of the United States. In doing
so, it integrates the history of self-deportation with the better-known
history of the deportation system to offer a new narrative about the rise
of the modern removal system overall. Section II.A recounts how the
increasing population of Chinese people in western states spurred
another round of subfederal self-deportation laws targeting it for public
discrimination; again, the Supreme Court found such laws preempted
by the federal prerogative to regulate removal, now under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s new prohibitions on discriminatory state action. Once more, the legislature and Executive responded by exercising
the federal prerogative to advance the national practice of direct removal, this time through the establishment of the individual deportation
system. As Congress widened this system’s reach and power, however,
it also notably leveraged the new threat of deportation to reshape its
self-deportation policy. Similarly, when the Executive escalated removals, it did not rely on its newly crafted legal channels so much as implement hybrid techniques that drew on the indirect effects of the deportation system. With subfederal help, it conducted widespread raids that
spread terror and caused self-deportation while bringing people into the
net of the deportation system; and for the mass removals of the Great
Depression, it used “voluntary departure” programs that recruited deportees with fear and the promise of financing their transportation out
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of the country. Section II.B then turns to the most recent cycle of subfederal self-deportation legislation, the Court’s rejection of most of its
provisions based on preemption, and the legislative and executive surge
in deportation policy that has followed in response. Here, consistent
with past practice, the Court granted subfederal governments direct
enforcement powers to broaden the reach of the deportation system.
The legislature and Executive concurrently and rapidly intensified the
deportation system by streamlining its processes and amplifying its
self-deportation effects. Indeed, the hallmark of contemporary removal
policy is its expansion of the grounds of deportability far beyond the
possibility of actual enforcement. The widespread threats these developments create function to subordinate a population on which the nation relies heavily for labor, suggesting that the policy works in the service of outcomes other than removal alone: now, the strong emphasis on
removal in discourse about immigration law and policy obscures
another effect of the immigration system — subordination in the service
of labor control.
A. The Individual Deportation System
and Its Self-Deportation Effects
In the mid-nineteenth century, the federal and state governments began to contemplate the removal of nonwhite immigrants, whom they
did not consider to be potential members of the national polity but who
were present in increasing numbers.163 As in the late 1820s, states and
municipalities began to pass legislation designed to attack different
aspects of these people’s lives. The Supreme Court asserted federal
supremacy over the regulation of removal and struck down these new
subfederal laws as discrimination, noting that the removal aim motivating them was evident. While it did so, the federal government exercised
its prerogative to build an individual deportation system upon the foundations of its indirect approach to removal, which began to work
through the new deportation system almost immediately.164
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
163 These immigrants came primarily from China, Japan, India, and Mexico, among other places.
See, e.g., Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law
and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615 (1981); Sherally Munshi, Race, Geography, and Mobility, 30 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 245, 246, 278 n.182 (2016). Government reports, including the Dillingham Commission
report of 1911, show that Mexican laborers were considered useful but undesirable as citizens, and
not potential members of the community. 1 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS, S. DOC. NO. 61-747, at 682–91 (3d Sess. 1910).
164 My analysis contests the idea that in the absence of federal direct removal policy, there was
no federal removal policy. Cf. HIROTA, supra note 29, at 9; DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION
NATION 92–95 (2007); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 58 (2014) (counting poor laws and
the Alien and Sedition Laws as antecedents and noting that other than these, “the nation operated
without federal regulation of immigration for the better part of the nineteenth century. Unfettered
migration was crucial for the settlement and industrialization of America, even if the laboring migrants themselves were not always free.”); DANIEL TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES 87–113 (2001);
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During this period, states and municipalities began to clamor for the
removal of Chinese immigrants.165 California Governor John Bigler
called for head taxes and a foreign miners’ tax to target this group, as
well as for their disqualification as jurors and witnesses in state
courts.166 In 1856, Mariposa County, California, ordered all the Chinese
within its jurisdiction to leave, or to be whipped and then removed “by
force of arms.”167 In 1860, San Francisco denied Chinese people admission to San Francisco City Hospital168 and Chinese children admission
to general public schools,169 and California passed “An Act to Protect
Free White Labor Against Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor.”170
In 1870, San Francisco banned the use of shoulder poles to carry vegetables and laundry bundles171 and, between 1873 and 1875, passed a
variety of ordinances banning the use of firecrackers and Chinese
ceremonial gongs.172
Again, the Supreme Court found that the federal government held
preemptive power to regulate removal from the country, and denied
state and local governments the power to directly subordinate the Chinese
toward that end. In its 1875 decision in Chy Lung v. Freeman,173 for
example, the Court struck down a California statute that “very clearly”
aimed to “extort money from a large class of passengers, or to prevent
their immigration to California altogether.”174 Over the next decade, the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Cox & Posner, supra note 21, at 816 (“[T]he U.S. federal government placed few formal restrictions
on immigration prior to the 1870s.”); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 483 (2009) (“For much of the nineteenth century, few immigration rules existed, and the treaty power played a central role in the adoption of some of the
earliest federal rules regulating immigrant admissions.”).
165 PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR OUR SOCIETY 36–37 (2010).
166 The California Supreme Court granted part of Bigler’s wish in People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399
(1854), by racially classifying Chinese people with Indians, blacks, and mulattoes to prevent them
from testifying against white defendants. See id. at 399, 403.
167 IRIS CHANG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 90 (2003).
168 Fae Myenne Ng, Orphan Bachelors, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2019, at 66; see also No Room for
Chinese: They Are Denied Admission to the County Hospital, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 20, 1881, at 3.
169 Act of Apr. 28, 1860, ch. 329,§ 8, 1860 Cal. Stat. 321, 325 (1860); William Courtney, San Francisco’s Anti-Chinese Ordinances, 1850–1900, at 8 (1956) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
San Francisco) (on file with the Harvard University Library); see also Joyce Kuo, Comment, Excluded, Segregated and Forgotten: A Historical View of the Discrimination of Chinese Americans
in Public Schools, 5 ASIAN L.J. 181 (1998); Ng, supra note 168, at 66.
170 Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 339, 1862 Cal. Stat. 462 (1862), invalidated by Lin Sing v. Washburn,
20 Cal. 534 (1862).
171 Order No. 697 (May 4, 1866), in SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1871–1872, ENDING JUNE 30, 1872, at 503, 520; Christopher Chou, Land Use and the
Chinatown Problem, 19 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 27, 40 (2014).
172 Order No. 697 (May 4, 1866), in SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1874–1875, ENDING JUNE 30, 1875, at 791, 807; Order No. 884 (July 29, 1869), in SAN
FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1868–1869, ENDING JUNE 30, 1869,
at 544, 544.
173 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
174 Id. at 275.
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Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to affirm its prohibition of subfederal self-deportation laws instituting public discrimination. In 1879, for example, Supreme Court Justice
Field, riding circuit, found that San Francisco’s “Pigtail Ordinance”
violated the prohibition on discriminatory state action because it
targeted Han Chinese prisoners who wore their hair in long braids.175
In the 1886 case Yick Wo v. Hopkins,176 the Court similarly struck down
a San Francisco law requiring permits to operate laundries in wooden
buildings, which targeted the Chinese population.177 It quoted a lower
court, which found that the law “indicate[d] a purpose to drive out the
Chinese laundrymen, and not merely to regulate the business for the
public safety.”178
Instead, during a period called the “Driving Out,” the work of
subordination fell to private citizens, who set fires to Chinatowns and
committed massacres and mob violence with little interference from law
enforcement.179 As they did so, Congress began to build the federal
individual deportation system. Most famously, the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882 for the first time prohibited the entry of a specific ethnic
group to preserve “good order” and brought individual deportation,
which had long been the province of states and municipalities, under
the purview of the federal government.180 During their first years, federal deportation laws focused only on immigrants’ preentry conduct and
contained statutes of limitation;181 courts ensured immigrants’ rights to
process,182 and the reach of the system was relatively limited. Nonetheless, the creation of the system itself sent a strong expressive message,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
175 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546); Joseph Tartakovsky,
Opinion, An Enlightened California Judge Paved the Way to Fight Trump’s Travel Ban More than
a Century Ago, L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2018, 4:05 AM), www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-tartakovsky-judge-stephen-field-20180603-story.html [https://perma.cc/R9WX-ETXT] (describing Field’s opposition to various anti-Chinese ordinances and referring to this law as the “infamous ‘pigtail ordinance’”).
176 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
177 See id. at 372–73.
178 Id. at 363 (quoting In re Yick Wo, 26 F. 471, 475 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886)).
179 CHANG, supra note 167, at 216–20.
180 The Act placed an absolute moratorium on the entry of Chinese labor for ten years, prohibited
Chinese people from becoming citizens, and required Chinese people who left the country to obtain
certifications to reenter. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, §§ 1, 12, 14, 22 Stat. 58, 59, 61 (making
deportable any Chinese person who entered unlawfully after its adoption), repealed by Act of Dec.
17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
181 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 (generalizing the provisions of the Act
of 1882). The first federal immigration controls that the Page Act introduced in 1875, as Cox and
Rodríguez observe, neither provided for deportation nor made mention of immigrants’ post entry
conduct. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 512, 514; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 1,
18 Stat. 477, 477. They note that the anomalous Alien and Enemies Act of 1798 is one exception.
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 512 n.184; see also Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, §§ 1–3, 1 Stat.
570, 570–71.
182 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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and the new threat of deportation combined with congressional
measures to make life more difficult for Chinese people in ways that
indirectly encouraged their removal.183 Congress also quickly began to
expand federal direct removal power by adding causes for which it could
deport a person under law, including a range of postentry conduct.
Between 1907 and 1922, it made deportable immigrants who engaged
in prostitution, advocated anarchy, committed crimes of moral turpitude, or had convictions for importing or dealing opium, respectively.184
It then began to eliminate statutes of limitations, making people indefinitely deportable for these reasons.185 Still, the Immigration Service
oversaw few deportations during this period — “only a few hundred
aliens a year between 1892 and 1907,”186 and an annual average of two
or three thousand between 1908 and 1920.187
Because employers again found themselves in need of cheap replacement labor during the era of Chinese Exclusion, inspectors did not
regulate Mexicans entering across the southwestern border for work in
railroad construction, mining, and agriculture during the first two
decades of the twentieth century.188 Many fundamental aspects of the
modern deportation system emerged during the 1920s. The Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 imposed numerical restrictions on immigration for the first time,189 creating the basis for a system of selective admissions. The 1924 Act finally eliminated statutes of limitations on
nearly all forms of unlawful entry. In Professor Mae Ngai’s words, these
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
183 For example, the 1892 Geary Act required Chinese people to obtain a certificate of residence
to prove their presence in the country was authorized. “Show me your papers” laws at this time
required an affirmative act, since the government did not issue social security numbers (or cards)
until the 1930s and birth certificates did not become common until the Second World War. The
Chinese community responded with massive civil disobedience, refused to apply for such certificates, and successfully prevented the government from enforcing this law. Act of May 5, 1892, ch.
60, § 3, 27 Stat. 25, 25 (creating a presumption that any Chinese resident was deportable “unless
such person shall establish, by affirmative proof, . . . his lawful right to remain in the United
States”); see LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS 43–68 (1995) (describing development of
documentation requirements).
184 Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889; Immigration Act of Feb. 20,
1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899–900. Cox and Rodríguez observe that the five-year statute of
limitations is one of the only such provisions that remains on the books. Cox & Rodríguez, supra
note 164, at 515; see also Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, § 2(e), 42 Stat. 596, 597.
185 Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, § 2, 40 Stat. 1012, 1012; Act of Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128, § 3, 36
Stat. 263, 264–65.
186 NGAI, supra note 164, at 59.
187 Id. Most of these deportees came from asylums, hospitals, and jails. Id. During the Palmer
Raids in the winter of 1919–1920, authorities arrested ten thousand alleged anarchists and deported
hundreds. KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 149–55; WILLIAM PRESTON JR., ALIENS AND
DISSENTERS 221 (1963).
188 NGAI, supra note 164, at 64.
189 The Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 made it possible to deport any person for entering without a
valid visa or inspection after July 1 of that year. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 14, 43 Stat.
153, 162.
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restrictions “stimulated the production of illegal aliens” to “mass proportions.”190 In 1925, Congress created a land Border Patrol, a force with
little supervision and no formal training that quickly assumed the character of criminal pursuit, despite being charged with enforcing civil
laws.191 Congress criminalized immigrants in 1929 by making unlawful
entry an independent criminal offense — a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment or a fine, or both — and a second unlawful entry after
deportation a felony carrying double the consequences of the first.192
The rapid expansion of the pool of deportable persons quickly outstripped the deportation capacity of the system. The deportation system
did facilitate an increasing number of actual deportations, but its capacity to deport the growing population of people subject to its reach was
inherently limited by the individual process it required.193 As Secretary
Kobach reflected nearly a century later, “[i]t takes considerable government manpower and other resources to arrest [a person], initiate removal
proceedings, detain him if necessary, provide the hearings and appellate
review to which he is entitled, and ultimately remove him.”194 As the
total number of deportations rose, these processes proved so costly for
the government that in 1928, the Assistant Secretary of Labor requested
a budget for deportations amounting to more than ten times the appropriation of the previous year.195
By contrast, Kobach notes, “[i]t costs the federal government very
little when aliens self-deport.”196 The new deportation system magnified
the government’s ability to threaten immigrants with apprehension, detention, and deportation. Deportation laws, in other words, immediately
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
190
191
192

NGAI, supra note 164, at 57.
Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049; NGAI, supra note 164, at 69.
Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, 45 Stat. 1551. Between 1930 and 1936, the Immigration Service
brought over 40,000 criminal cases against unlawful entrants and won convictions in about 36,000,
or 90%, of them. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1929); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1930); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1931); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1932); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1933); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1934); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1935); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR (1936).
193 KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 216.
194 Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement, supra note 12, at 162.
195 See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 3, H.R.
5673, H.R. 6069, 70th Cong. 7–9 (1928) (statement of Robe Carl White).
196 Kobach, Attritution Through Enforcement, supra note 12, at 162.
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began to serve the double purpose they do now. Indeed, the indirect
function of the new deportation system quickly produced the irony that
although deportation laws on the books allowed for the removal of a
larger population than ever before during the 1920s and 1930s, the vast
majority of people removed during this time did not leave through the
process created by these laws.197 Rather, the federal government combined direct and indirect methods in such programs as “voluntary departure” and raids that, on the pretense of enforcing deportation law,
terrorized communities to encourage them to self-deport.
In the early 1920s, the United States worked with the Mexican government to create a “voluntary departure” program administered by
Mexican consuls that provided “free return transportation to the
Mexican interior and subsistence” to around 100,000 people between
1920 and 1923.198 The government thereby recruited deportees by
promising to cover some of their costs in a compromise that, like the
exchanges of lands the United States engaged in with tribes a century
earlier, saved the government significant funds while also relieving deportees of some burdens.199 In 1927, the Immigration Service again began to offer “voluntary departure” to aliens without criminal records to
avoid the time and expense of formal deportation proceedings.200 The
number of people the government expelled each year consequently rose
from 2762 in 1920201 to 9495 in 1925,202 and to 38,796 in 1929.203
During the Great Depression, economic insecurity further inflamed
white Americans’ racial hostility toward people of Mexican descent, regardless of whether these people were in the country legally or not, or
were citizens.204 Although immigration from Mexico had abated,205 removal numbers reached new heights206 as the Border Patrol, under the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
197

Manuel García y Griego, The Importation of Mexican Contract Laborers to the United States,

1942–1964: Antecedents, Operation, and Legacy, in THE BORDER THAT JOINS 49, 53 (Peter G.

Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1983).
198 NGAI, supra note 164, at 72.
199 See supra section I.B.1, pp. 1898–1901.
200 NGAI, supra note 164, at 150; see also Mae Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien, 21
LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 77 (2003).
201 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF
IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 10 (1920) (figure excludes fifteen deportations
under the Chinese Exclusion laws).
202 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF
IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 9 (1925).
203 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF
IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 1 (1929) (figure combines deportations and “voluntary departures”).
204 NGAI, supra note 164, at 71.
205 Id.
206 JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER 27 (2002) (recounting that an estimated
415,000 people were deported between 1929 and 1935, with another 85,000 leaving “voluntarily”);
see also KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 218.
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auspices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), began to
apprehend large numbers of people in “sweeps.”207 During this period,
the federal government sought to enlist state and local aid to increase
the capacity of the federal deportation system and its self-deportation
effects. In particular, U.S. Secretary of Labor William Doak “encouraged local immigration officers, law enforcement agencies, and newspapers to join forces to publicize deportation raids, frightening many
Mexicans into self-deportation.”208 State and municipal agents thereafter
collaborated with federal officers to conduct surprise raids that involved
intimidation tactics including circling and barricading in residents of
colonias and that resulted in the arrest, interrogation, and
detention of scores of people.209 The head of the L.A. Citizens
Committee on the Coordination of Unemployment Relief, Charles Visel,
commended the Immigration Service’s “efficiency, aggressiveness, [and]
resourcefulness” in using these tactics, stating: “The exodus of aliens deportable and otherwise who have been scared out of the community has
undoubtedly left many jobs which have been taken up by other persons
(not deportable) and citizens of the U.S. and our municipality.”210
In these raids, the federal deportation power served as the excuse for
spreading terror that fueled both self-deportation and the success of local “voluntary departure” programs across the Southwest and Midwest.
Welfare bureaus and relief workers played a significant role in pressuring immigrants to leave.211 One major obstacle to their wholesale deportation, however, was the expense of deportation hearings, which
meant, as Californians concluded, that actual deportation “could not be
used to advantage in ousting any large number.”212 Instead, Los Angeles
county relief agencies opened negotiations with the Southern Pacific
Railroad to organize “voluntary departure” programs, and discovered
that “in wholesale lots, the Mexicans could be shipped to Mexico City
for $14.70 per capita . . . less than the cost of a week’s board and lodging.”213 During the early 1930s, Southwestern and Midwestern states
removed over 400,000 people, many by train.214 A large number had
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
207
208

NGAI, supra note 164, at 70.
KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 218. Arguing that deporting Mexicans would create jobs
for citizens, Doak claimed that one quarter of around 400,000 “illegal aliens” in the country were
immediately deportable under existing law. Id. at 215.
209 See id. at 219 (describing raid on La Placita in early 1931 by U.S. immigration officers and
Los Angeles police); NGAI, supra note 164, at 73 (describing raid of a colonia in San Fernando by
Immigration Service and deputy sheriffs).
210 NGAI, supra note 164, at 73.
211 KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 218; NGAI, supra note 164, at 73, 75.
212 KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 218 (quoting Carey McWilliams, Repatriados, AM. MERCURY,
Mar. 1933, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook_print.cfm?smtid=3&psid=591 [https://
perma.cc/3D4K-HQ4L]).
213 Id.
214 NGAI, supra note 164, at 72.
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been in the country for at least a decade, and an estimated 60% were
citizens, children, or both.215 In a final “voluntary” deportation at the
end of the decade, the INS transported 1200 people, about half of whom
were citizens, to the border with Mexico at Brownsville, Texas.216
At this time, state and local governments focused on welfare, local
law enforcement policies, and public employment as areas where they
might permissibly discriminate against immigrants. Drawing on the tradition of poor laws, California towns passed settlement laws denying
welfare to unemployed migrant workers. In El Paso, Texas, local relief
agencies reported lists of Mexicans on their rolls, including citizens and
legal residents, to immigration authorities for deportation.217 Many
towns, including the City of Los Angeles, tried to keep indigent migrants
from entering by stationing police at “bum blockades.”218 Colorado
Governor Edwin C. Johnson sought to reserve “the possibility of
employment . . . for only native sons,”219 proclaimed martial law in
southern counties in 1936, and instructed Military District officers to
prevent Mexican workers with labor contracts from entering the
state.220 Arizona passed laws punishing anyone who hired noncitizens
as public employees with a fine or imprisonment.221
The way the federal government coordinated the direct removal of
over one million people of Mexican ancestry during this era222 was consistent with the historical development of its removal policy. Subfederal
entities’ role was restricted to expanding the federal government’s deportation capacity, determining local law enforcement priorities, and
denying unauthorized immigrants welfare and public employment.
Both federal and state governments stoked the hostility of private citizens toward Mexicans to encourage them to make life unbearable for
Mexicans so that they would self-deport. The individual deportation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
215
216
217

Id.
Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 72 (citing Letter from Edward Shaughnessy to Harry Coffee (June 4, 1935) (file
55854/100, INS)).
218 Id. at 71 (citing Paul S. Taylor, Migratory Farm Labor in the United States, 44 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 537, 547 (1937), in LABOR ON THE LAND 1930–1970, at 91, 101 (1981)).
219 FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL:
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S, at 89 (1995).
220 NGAI, supra note 164, at 71.
221 Act of Mar. 3, 1931, ch. 31, sec. 2, § 1352a, 1931 Ariz. Sess. Laws 53, 54; Act of Mar. 19, 1929,
ch. 85, sec. 2, § 1353, 1929 Ariz. Sess. Laws 267, 267–68. For a much more extensive catalog of
status-based prohibitions on employment in states across the country, see Harold Fields, Where
Shall the Alien Work?, 12 SOC. FORCES 213, 213–21 (1933).
222 KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 215. Estimates of the total population removed during this
period vary. Motomura estimates that around two million were forced to leave the United States
as a result of the raids conducted by federal, state, and local officials during this period.
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 41. Ngai writes that “nearly
20 percent of the Mexican population in the United States returned to Mexico during the early years
of the Depression,” and that “the repatriation of Mexicans was a racial expulsion program exceeded
in scale only by the Native American removals of the nineteenth century.” NGAI, supra note 164, at 75.
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system, however, strengthened and systematized the coordination between the actors carrying out removal policy. An emerging bureaucracy
of federal immigration officers assumed a newly significant role in removal policy and collaborated explicitly and routinely with state and
local law enforcement. All actors, public and private, could use as new
leverage the threat of deportation furnished to carry out their work. As
the volume of federal removal laws burgeoned, those laws threatened
an ever-increasing number of immigrants, growing the government’s coercive bargaining power vis-à-vis deportees. In other words, the individual deportation system breathed new life into the well-worn indirect
approach to removal in the United States.
B. Mass Removal Strategies in the Modern Era
The national removal system’s evolution during the first half of the
twentieth century set the stage for the developments that followed.
Courts continued to cabin states’ and municipalities’ role within the national removal scheme and protect the federal government’s coordina
ting role. Congress continued to expand the grounds of deportability far
beyond the possibility of enforcement. In combination with the private
sector’s creation of incentives through the furnishing of jobs, which
induced people to enter the country,223 these trends resulted in an
enormous population of deportable people in the country and a national
immigration code that went largely unenforced. This production of an
excess of options to legally remove people widened the berth of executive
discretion both to determine its deportation priorities and to calibrate
self-deportation policy by leveraging the threats inherent in federal
deportation law. Below, I describe the developments in immigration
law, including the establishment of alienage case law and growth of the
federal immigration code, that led to the most recent wave of subfederal
attempts to legislate public discrimination, courts’ preemption of these
laws, and the ways that the subsequent legislative and executive buildup of the deportation system has worked to maximize its selfdeportation effects.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
223 The Bracero Program, which bridged the first and second halves of the century, provides a
good illustration of the delegation to the private sphere that allowed employers to incentivize immigration to the United States. After the statutory authorization for this war-time worker recruitment program expired in 1947, see Farm Labor Supply Program-Extension-Liquidation, Pub. L.
No. 80-40, 61 Stat. 55 (1947), the INS allowed employers to directly recruit bracero workers from
Mexico. The INS further helped to reduce the costs of recruitment for employers and encourage
workers’ unauthorized entry by prioritizing, for a period, the legalization of unauthorized immigrants already present in the United States. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE 2 (1992).
Indeed, in 1951, President Truman’s Commission on Migratory Labor found that the INS “had
effectively abdicated its border control responsibility” and that its legalization policies, lax enforcement, with the incentives created by employers, “had given rise to unprecedented levels of illegal
immigration.” Id. The program was not terminated for another seventeen years. Id. at 3.
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In the twentieth century, states and municipalities continued to pass
self-deportation legislation in the tradition of extension laws. The Court
continued to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on public
discrimination, thereby establishing a famous line of cases scrutinizing
the status of “alienage.”224 In the 1948 case Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Commission,225 the Court struck down a California statute forbidding
aliens “ineligible to citizenship” from receiving commercial fishing licenses;226 in Graham v. Richardson227 in 1971, the Court invalidated an
Arizona law requiring citizenship or fifteen years of residence to receive
welfare benefits;228 and in 1982, in Plyler v. Doe,229 the Court struck
down a state statute denying funding for unauthorized children, blocking a municipal school district’s attempt to charge unauthorized children
an annual tuition fee.230 In the 1976 case Mathews v. Diaz,231 however,
the Court affirmed and reserved the federal government’s right to discriminate as a privilege of its supremacy in the field of immigration.232
It is worth noting how this development contributed to interpretations that have isolated the component parts of self-deportation policy
and made it more difficult to grasp their overall logic. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s consecration of the prohibition on public discrimination
led to courts’ application of this doctrine to some self-deportation laws
and the doctrine of preemption to others. This split has given rise to an
artificial yet potent division between “alienage laws,” or laws imposing
conditions upon alien status, and “immigration laws,” or laws affecting
a person’s entry into, exit from, or authorization within the country.233
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
224 With some notable exceptions: During the second and third decades of the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of western states’ alien land laws. See,
e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O’Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb,
263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). These laws first targeted immigrants’ fee simple ownership of or long-term lease of agricultural lands, and then targeted their
ability to hold sharecropping contracts or shares of stock in corporations owning such lands. See
Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: Early Twentieth Century “Alien Land Laws” as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 38 (1998). The Court’s decisions scrutinizing alienage status indicate a
continuing intimacy between property and membership, while the Court’s invocation of the
Fourteenth Amendment indicates that its discomfort with subfederal institution of public discrimination might stem from the legacy of Jim Crow.
225 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
226 Id. at 412, 422.
227 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
228 Id. at 371, 374.
229 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
230 Id. at 216, 230.
231 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
232 Id. at 84–85.
233 MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 58. In 1994, Professor
Linda Bosniak explained how these categories produce different legal possibilities, since in “the
world of social relationships among territorially present persons, . . . government power to impose
disabilities on people based on their status is substantially constrained,” while the government’s

1922

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1878

With respect to this doctrinal confusion, many scholars have noted that
these categories overlap as a practical matter;234 because laws concerning entry and exit affect how immigrants live, and vice versa, Professor
Adam Cox, for example, has written that “legal rules cannot be classified
as concerning either selection or regulation because every rule concerns
both.”235 This overlap is not incidental, however, in self-deportation
laws, which concern both selection and regulation by design. Nonetheless, it has become common sense to see the infringement of these categories upon each other as only ancillary, as evidenced in two widespread
ideas: 1) that federal immigration laws inflict suffering as an unfortunate
byproduct of their other, legitimate goals; and 2) that state and municipal alienage laws can impose some “appropriate” level of discrimination,
but exceed what is “tolerable” when they infringe on the federal immigration power by affecting entry and exit.236 Notably, framing this over–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
immigration power, by contrast, “remains exceptionally unconstrained.” Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1056 (1994).
Kobach therefore advocated for subfederal self-deportation laws as properly constructed immigration regulations, skirting the question of discrimination altogether in his theory of “attrition through
enforcement.” See sources cited supra note 12. He put forth a rubric for drafting statutes to avoid
federal preemption, Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law, supra note 12, at 464–65, and elsewhere
argued that self-deportation laws would act as a “quintessential force multiplier,” see Kris W.
Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005).
234 See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 233; Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2449, 2451–52 (2007) (showing that the distinction between alienage and immigration law is
highly problematic); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition
187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (1994); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return
to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 120 (2013) (“[C]haracterizing subfederal regulations as either ‘immigration’ or ‘alienage’ is frustrated by the very nature of the inquiry and by the
inescapable truth that subfederal regulations are usually a bit of both.”); Michael J. Wishnie,
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 526 (2001) (observing that the distinction is not consistently embraced in
case law). But see Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 798–99 (2008) (acknowledging this overlap but emphasizing the importance
of the distinction for understanding immigration federalism); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 591–93 (2008) (drawing a
distinction between “[d]irect enforcement measures” and “[i]ndirect enforcement measures,” but
acknowledging that public benefits statutes also “operate as forms of indirect enforcement, because
they discourage immigrant settlement and prompt what restrictionists call ‘self-deportation,’ or
movement to other communities or to the home country”).
235 Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 343 (2008).
236 In his discussion of Proposition 187, for example, Neuman argues for limits on discrimination
against aliens, writing that “even if some goods can be reserved for citizens, it hardly follows that
all goods can.” Neuman, supra note 16, at 1427. During oral arguments for Plyler, Justice
Thurgood Marshall queried whether such limits derive from the harm to the targeted group or to
greater society, and asked the attorney for Texas if the state could deny fire protection to unauthorized persons. MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 19. When the
attorney said he did not think that it could, Justice Marshall asked rhetorically, “Why
not? . . . Somebody’s house is more important than his child?” Id. Bosniak, too, asked when,
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lap as nonessential obscures two of the most important aspects of contemporary self-deportation policy: 1) the use of alienage provisions precisely to make life intolerable and thereby cause a group’s removal; and
2) the use of deportation law to subordinate a class of workers.
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act237 (INA) consolidated
the provisions governing entry, removal, and authorized presence in the
United States.238 This law established a selective admissions system
that eventually created preferences for skilled laborers and relatives of
citizens.239 The 1952 Act also initiated a streamlining of process by
making the crime of illegal entry a “petty offense” punishable by six
months’ imprisonment, channeling these cases to new misdemeanor
courts, and thereby eliminating grand jury indictments and jury trials,
to reduce both the expenses and protections of the process.240 During
the next decades, the unauthorized population grew as a result of the
new caps on admissions, lax enforcement on the southern border for
labor purposes,241 and legislative acts that deauthorized more and more
persons already present in the United States. Through a series of
restrictive amendments, Congress continued to expand the grounds of
deportability to apply to lawful entrants who overstayed their visas and
individuals who engaged in an increasingly wide range of post-entry
conduct.242 As Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have commented, the consequence of the new laws was to render both “a huge
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
through imposing suffering upon those who perform “much of our society’s undesirable labor[,] . . .
immigration regulation exceeds its legitimate bounds and becomes little more than a mechanism
for institutionalizing the status of a permanent underclass in our society.” Bosniak, supra note 233,
at 1146–47.
237 Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 1632 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
238 See Developments in the Law — Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646
(1953).
239 See id. at 652. The law also abolished the racial restrictions of previous immigration and
naturalization statutes, see Mae Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law, 86
J. AM. HIST. 67, 81 (1999), but retained national-origin quotas until Congress passed the Hart-Celler
Act in 1965, see Munshi, supra note 163, at 281.
240 Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1326–27 (2010).
241 Cf. López, supra note 163, at 667–72; Gerald P. López, Don’t We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1770–73 (2012).
242 See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 512; INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)
(2012); INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C). In 1988, Congress made deportable any noncitizen with a conviction for an “aggravated felony.” Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100690, § 7344(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4470–71 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251). While the INA initially defined
“aggravated felony” as a serious drug trafficking offense, in 1990, 1994, and 1996, Congress expanded the definition of the term to include minor convictions and even some misdemeanors; it also
made these provisions retroactive. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat.
4978, 5048 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1501, 1501 note); Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101, 1101 note); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–627 to 3009–628 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101,
1101 note); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110
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fraction of resident noncitizens deportable at the option of the
Executive” and the laws on the books mostly unenforced.243
In the early 1990s, economic depression spurred a new wave of antiimmigrant sentiment.244 In 1994, California voters passed Proposition
187, which included diverse provisions conscripting state and local law
enforcement in the apprehension of unauthorized persons, prohibiting
schools and hospitals from serving unauthorized persons, and criminalizing identity fraud.245 While the bill purported to “provide for cooperation between agencies of state and local government with the federal
government” to regulate immigration,246 a U.S. district court insisted
that the authority to coordinate national removal policy belonged to the
federal government alone.247 Nonetheless, states and municipalities
subsequently introduced hundreds of bills on the model of Proposition
187, many of which met the same end.248 Despite its general failure to
create good law, this subfederal legislation illustrated the capacity of
self-deportation laws to achieve their intended effects even without surviving a preemption challenge. Because they were calculated to spur
people’s action in anticipation of harm, the laws often had immediate
impact; indeed, their effects frequently manifested even before their passage. For example, before the vote to pass a self-deportation bill in Avon
Park, Florida, in 2006, business owners “saw a drop in business from
immigrants wary of coming into their shops. At area farms, droves of
workers stopped showing up to milk the cows and harvest the crops,
afraid of being arrested. Landlords saw a sudden rise in vacant apartments.”249 Professor Angela M. Banks has also shown that the laws
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Stat. 1214, 1276–79 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) (defining “aggravated felony”); Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 730, 737 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that the Illinois Class A misdemeanor of criminal sexual abuse constitutes an “aggravated felony” for purposes of the INA); CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 71.05(2)(d) (examining case law interpreting the breadth of “aggravated felony”);
Dawn Marie Johnson, Note, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for
Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477 (2001).
243 Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 511; see also MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE
LAW, supra note 3, at 26.
244 Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to the
United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 943–44 (1994).
245 Initiative Statute, Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West).
246 Id.
247 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1253–55 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
248 This trend began with Proposition 187 itself. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768–69 (C.D. Cal. 1995); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
401–02 (2012). Consistently, however, courts did uphold provisions requiring employers to use the
federal E-Verify system to ascertain the status of employees and authorizing state and local police
to determine the immigration status of persons. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563
U.S. 582, 607–11 (2011); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1283–85 (11th Cir. 2012).
249 Christina E. Sanchez, Avon Park Mayor Isn’t Giving Up, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB. (July
26, 2006), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20060726/News/605228621/SH/ [https://perma.
cc/L3LZ-644M].
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discouraged immigrants from naturalizing even when they were eligible.250 Finally, the laws had a viral effect on private citizens: after the
passage of H.B. 56, citizens in Alabama “acted as if they themselves
were deputized to enforce H.B. 56”;251 the laws motivated antiimmigrant activism and hardened non-Hispanic citizens’ views of all
Hispanics, regardless of citizenship, while increasing white citizens’
fears about lawlessness and crime.252
These laws, and their preemption, have been accompanied by a
massive buildup of the deportation system by Congress and the
Executive.253 Shortly after the passage of Proposition 187, Congress
passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996254 (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act255 (AEDPA). With these laws, Congress surprised a huge population of lawful entrants by deauthorizing their presence, in addition
to narrowing both long-standing pathways to obtaining authorized status and forms of relief such as cancellation of removal.256 As these legislative changes catalyzed the commission of new immigration violations, the executive branch concurrently ratcheted up enforcement but
could not keep up with the scale of these legislative transformations.
Between 1993 and 1999, for example, the annual budget of the INS
nearly tripled to reach $4.2 billion; by 2010, the combined budgets of its
successor agencies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), together reconstituted as the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
250 Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2012). The U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services’s (USCIS’s) push to denaturalize individuals under the Obama-era program
Operation Janus is likely to have the same effect. Cf. Amy Taxin, U.S. Launches Bid to Find Citizenship Cheaters, AP NEWS (June 11, 2018), https://apnews.com/1da389a535684a5f9d0da74081c242f3
[https://
perma.cc/6FJN-X6RQ] (describing USCIS’s Operation Janus initiative).
251 Benjamin D. Galloway, Comment, Perpetual Congressional Inaction: State Regulation of Immigration in Response to Lack of Reform, 65 MERCER L. REV. 795, 820 (2014).
252 See René D. Flores, The Social Consequences of Subnational Restrictionist Immigration Policies in the U.S., at III (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Princeton University) (on file
with author).
253 See, e.g., Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.) (2012); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (2012).
254 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (2012).
255 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)
(2012). Indeed, after California Governor Gray Davis abandoned the state’s appeal of the 1998
ruling that found most of Proposition 187 unconstitutional, he commented that, “Yes, but” —
despite the formal failure of Proposition 187 — “it is supplanted by federal legislation that is faithful
to the will of the voters who passed 187.” GRACE CHANG, DISPOSABLE DOMESTICS 8 (2016).
256 MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 28. The legislative path
therefore raises a puzzle: In the face of a supposed “crisis” of enforcement, why would Congress
exacerbate the situation by choosing, among other things, to convert legally present persons into
more unauthorized immigrants?
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, exceeded $20 billion.257 Nonetheless, in 2010, ICE had the capacity to arrest only about
2–3% of the estimated 22 million unauthorized persons present in the
United States.258
The fruits of this growth have encompassed a succession of programs
and initiatives to further strip deportation of procedural protections, reduce the costs of deportation, and maximize the self-deportation effects
of the deportation system. In 2005, DHS and DOJ’s joint initiative
“Operation Streamline” began the practice of now-routine en masse,
“fast track” trials of up to seventy defendants at once, with proceedings
lasting as little as twenty-five seconds for each individual.259 In 2008,
ICE unsuccessfully tried to replicate historical “voluntary departure”
programs with an initiative entitled “Operation Scheduled Departure,”260
which sought to avoid the costs of apprehending and detaining immigrants. However, only eight out of 457,000 eligible immigrants appeared
for deportation.261 More successfully, the federal government has increasingly delegated law enforcement power to state and local law officials to expand the reach of the deportation system, especially by integrating immigration and criminal law systems while emphasizing the
“criminal alien” in policy justifications.262 The federal government has
also rapidly escalated its reliance upon summary removal proceedings,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
257
258

Id. at 50.
Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All ICE
Employees (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter Morton Memo]; Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi et al., The
Number of Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: Estimates Based on Modeling with
Demographic Data from 1990–2016, PLOS ONE (2018), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193
[https://perma.cc/S9ZL-CMYG].
259 See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in “Streamline” Justice on Border, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1fWYvIU [https://perma.cc/E8LN-KWTC].
260 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE Scheduled Departure Program for Non-Criminal Fugitive Aliens, https://web.archive.org/web/20080917222707/http://www.ice.gov/scheduleddeparture/index.htm [https://perma.cc/43VK-3E3B]. This program and its historical antecedents
should not be confused with the statutory options of “voluntary departure” under INA § 240(B) and
withdrawal of application for entry under INA § 235(a)(4). For an overview of the statistical significance of such “returns,” see ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALIEN REMOVALS
AND RETURNS 14 (2015), which describes how the number of such returns exceeded 1 million
persons annually between 1997 and 2006, with the exception of 2003.
261 ALEXANDRA FILINDRA, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR.,
THE MYTH OF SELF DEPORTATION 5–6 (Apr. 2012).
262 For descriptions and analyses of this integration, see Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137 (2009); Angélica Cházaro, Challenging
the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594, 643 (2016); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice
for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1146
(2013); Eagly, supra note 240, at 1300; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 475 (2007);
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 367, 381 (2006).
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including expedited removal,263 reinstatement of removal,264
administrative removal,265 and stipulated orders of removal.266 As a
result of such processes, in 2015 and 2016, in approximately 85% of all
deportations conducted by the United States, individuals did not have a
hearing, never saw an immigration judge, and were deported through
“cursory administrative processes where the same presiding immigration
officer acted as the prosecutor, judge, and jailor.”267
Within the individual deportation system, the new absence of procedural protections creates numerous opportunities for government agents
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
263 In 1996, the IIRIRA added expedited removal to the INA, making it mandatory for DHS
officials to return arriving noncitizens without authorization at ports of entry to their countries of
origin, without delay and without an immigration court proceeding. INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1) (2012). Expedited removals have risen from 23,487 in total in 1997, to a total of around
193,000 in 2013, constituting 44% of all removals. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 166 (1999); JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 1
(2014).
264 See, e.g., INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); Apprehension and Detention of Aliens
Ordered Removed, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2001). Particular harms arise at the intersections of expedited
removals and reinstatement of removals, which Professor Jennifer Lee Koh describes as “legal black
holes.” Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching for Solutions to the Legal Black
Holes Created by Expedited Removal and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2018).
265 In administrative proceedings, individuals can be deported before seeing a judge. INA § 238,
8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2012); Expedited Removal of Aggravated Felons, 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2016). For a
discussion of expedited removal, reinstatement of removal, and administrative removal, see Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE
& L. 1, 6–10 (2014).
266 A stipulated order of removal is a deportation order entered without a hearing and signed by
an immigration judge, constituting “a conclusive determination of the alien’s removability from the
United States.” INA § 240(a)(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(d) (2012). ICE described stipulated removal
orders as “a good avenue for judicial economy in that they create operational efficiencies for both
the immigration and criminal courts.” U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, PROTECTING
THE HOMELAND: A TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS 32 (Apr. 2011). Ninety-six percent of individuals who signed stipulated orders between 2004 and 2011 did not have a lawyer. JENNIFER
LEE KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 8 (Sept. 2011); see also Jennifer Lee
Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration
Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 495 (2013).
267 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS
THE COURTROOM 2 (Dec. 2014). These proceedings also routinely deny asylum seekers the opportunity to apply for asylum. See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
4 (Feb. 2005); U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION:
THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 22 (2016) [hereinafter
USCIRF, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION]. The President’s tweet advocating that prospective entrants to the country should be immediately deported “with no Judges or Court Cases,” Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329 [https://perma.cc/6MJB-M753], articulates a proposal
that is already close to the de facto norm, see Jennifer Lee Koh & Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Opinion,
Deport, Not Court? The U.S. Is Already Doing That, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2018), http://www.
latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-koh-wadhia-deportations-20180630-story.html [https://perma.cc/
7T24-UXGC].
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to coerce individuals to become the agents of their own removal, or selfdeport. In this refurbished system, frontline agents of Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP) and the Office of Field Operations (OFO) wield
tremendous power.268 CBP, for example, routinely intercepts arriving
noncitizens at ports of entry along the southern border, including on
bridges, and convinces them to turn back in contravention of their right
to seek asylum.269 Government observers have found that immigration
officers regularly coerce individuals to accept “voluntary” returns and
departures by signing removal forms they cannot read or do not understand.270 Immigration officers also pressure individuals to take plea
agreements requiring them to waive their rights to trial and appeal, and
sometimes containing immigration waivers compelling them to relinquish their asylum or protection claims.271 When individuals self-deport
within the deportation system in this way, as with voluntary departures,
the government regains some of the control over a person’s departure
that it relinquishes when they self-deport outside of it.
In addition to normalizing skeletal procedures, toward similar ends,
the Executive has increasingly subjected noncitizens to punitive, carceral detention conditions, including freezing holding cells called “ice
boxes,”272 as well as lengthy and potentially indefinite sentences.273
More recently, it has also chosen to exercise its discretion to selectively
enforce deportation laws in spectacularly harsh ways. Perhaps most
notoriously, it has separated children from their parents and prosecuted
these parents for illegal entry or reentry.274 In the summer of 2017, the
Executive increased its use of this practice,275 and in spring 2018, it separated around 2000 children from their parents over the course of about
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
268 In 2005, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) had already
found “alarming” evidence that CBP and OFO were routinely conducting their responsibilities to
create inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable records for immigration law judges. USCIRF, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 267, at 19.
269 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 15–16 (Jan. 2018).
270 USCIRF recommended in 2014 that CBP ensure OFO officers and Border Patrol agents understand they have no authority to reject or assess claims of fear or eligibility for asylum. USCIRF,
BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 267, at 32–33; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
supra note 267, at 5, 21. December 2013 statistics from ICE show 23,455 voluntary returns took
place in FY 2013. Id. at 23.
271 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 269, at 19–20. One federal public defender from
Florida observed that the government uses “the hammer of threat of prosecution and a long prison
sentence to [convince immigrants to] give up the rights in an immigration case.” Id. at 20.
272 USCIRF, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 267, at 58.
273 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 868 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the
potentially indefinite detention, without bond, of certain categories of aliens awaiting removal
proceedings).
274 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 269, at 24.
275 See id.
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six weeks.276 White House Chief of Staff John Kelly defended the policy
against a national uproar as a “tough deterrent,” declaring that the
“name of the game is deterrence”;277 Attorney General Jefferson Sessions
stated the policy was “necessary” to keep people from “stamped[ing]” the
borders.278 ICE has since denied bond to parents separated from their
children who are eligible to apply for asylum and distributed forms to
coerce them to relinquish their claims and agree to removal in exchange
for the return of their children.279 One parent declared in a pending
court case that the officers “said the children would not return [and that]
‘it is the price you pay for crossing the border. We do this so that when
you return to your countries you do not return, and so you tell your
relatives not to come because we will take your children from you.’”280
Indeed, the current Administration’s commitment to spectacle appears to stem from the purpose of encouraging immigrant communities
to leave. Deterrence measures, for example, clearly and openly intend
to harness the indirect effects of direct enforcement to discourage people
from entering unlawfully and encourage those who have entered unlawfully to leave. However, selective, widely broadcast cruelty by the federal government to immigrants, combined with clear expressions of hostility directed at immigrant communities,281 does more than just produce
imminent threats. It affects a broader community by triggering fearbased responses even before a law or policy is actually implemented.282
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
276 Lisa Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, Trump Admin Ran “Pilot Program” for Separating
Migrant Families in 2017, NBC NEWS (Jun. 29, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
immigration-border-crisis/trump-admin-ran-pilot-program-separating-migrant-families-2017n887616 [https://perma.cc/3WWP-N57P].
277 William Cummings, John Kelly Defends Separating Immigrant Families, Saying “The Name
of the Game Is Deterrence,” USA (MAY 11, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://usat.ly/2rB4u44
[https://perma.cc/J737-2C6M]; see Michelle Mark, John Kelly: It’s Not “Cruel” to Separate Families
at the Border — Children Will Be “Put into Foster Care or Whatever,” BUS. INSIDER (May 11,
2018, 2:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/john-kelly-family-separation-policy-illegal-bordercrossing-2018-5 [https://perma.cc/T7LE-AGZ5].
278 Christopher Ingraham, Sessions Says Family Separation Is Necessary to Keep the Country
from Being Overwhelmed. Federal Immigration Data Says Otherwise., WASH. POST (June 18,
2018), https://wapo.st/2K3G4v6 [https://perma.cc/A7HR-8JVF]. CBP data shows apprehensions at
the southwestern border have dropped to levels near historic lows. See id.
279 Caitlin Dickson, New ICE Form to Separated Parents: Choose Deportation With or Without
Kids, YAHOO (July 3, 2018), https://www.yahoo.com/news/new-ice-form-separated-parents-choosedeportation-without-kids-232452897.html [https://perma.cc/5E3E-8LK7]. The form can be accessed
here: http://media1.s-nbcnews.com/i/today/z_creative/iceform.jpg [https://perma.cc/C28W-64XU].
280 Declaration of Maricela Batres at 2, Washington v. Trump, No. 18-cv-00939 (W.D. Wash. July
2, 2018).
281 For instance, the Trump Administration has justified its zero-tolerance policy by citing “infest[ation]” by immigrants. Hamed Aleaziz, Trump’s Claim that Migrants “Infest” Country Seen as
Whipping Up Fear, S.F. CHRON. (June 19, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/
article/Trump-s-claim-that-migrants-infest-13008615.php [https://perma.cc/FLU8-2M52].
282 In this respect, the expressive power of such articulations and policies is similar to that of
subfederal self-deportation. See supra pp. 1924-25.
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Within this framework, many of the current Administration’s actions
gain coherence, including its vocal embrace of a zero-tolerance policy
with respect to unauthorized immigration;283 its implementation of
travel bans against persons from a number of majority-Muslim countries;284 and its vows to add 5000 agents to CBP and 10,000 agents to
ICE,285 terminate Temporary Protected Status for individuals from
Haiti and El Salvador,286 retaliate against sanctuary cities and states
with raids,287 attempt to denaturalize immigrant citizens,288 expand expedited removal,289 and build a 2000-mile border wall between the
United States and Mexico.290 These policy announcements may or may
not ever result in actual or successful policies. Nonetheless, their official
announcement itself has a non-negligible impact. It contributes to the
suffering, subordination, and self-deportation of both the people who
are their clear targets and the citizens who are part of their networks.291
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
283 Miriam Valverde, What You Need to Know About the Trump Administration’s Zero-Tolerance
Immigration Policy, POLITIFACT (June 6, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/
2018/jun/06/what-you-need-know-about-trump-administrations-zer/ [https://perma.cc/C75E-HNW4].
284 Michael D. Shear, New Order Indefinitely Bars Almost All Travel from Seven Countries, N.Y.
TIMES (Sep. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ynmNvf [https://perma.cc/6YU9-V7GN].
285 Brennan Weiss, Trump Wants 15,000 More Agents to Patrol the US Border, but Immigration
Authorities Say There’s One Big Problem, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.
businessinsider.com/border-patrol-cant-handle-thousands-of-new-agents-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/
6T9C-CNE2].
286 Karen DeYoung & Nick Miroff, Trump Administration to End Provisional Residency Protection for 60,000 Haitians, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), http://wapo.st/2zTzCS9
[https://perma.cc/CA2M-SP6E]; Miriam Jordan, Trump Administration Says That Nearly 200,000
Salvadorans Must Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2EmEtKl [https://perma.cc/
2MTD-DVJS].
287 Matt Shuham, ICE Director Calls for Arrest of ‘Sanctuary’ City and State Officials, TALKING
POINTS MEMO (Jan. 3, 2018), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/thomas-homan-arrest-politicians-sanctuary-cities-states [https://perma.cc/8F9S-J4WW].
288 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, USCIS Partners with Justice Department and
Secures First Denaturalization as a Result of Operation Janus, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVICES, (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-partners-justicedepartment-and-secures-first-denaturalization-result-operation-janus [https://perma.cc/H5CC-9YNG].
289 Abigail Hauslohner & David Makamura, In Memo, Trump Administration Weighs Expanding
the Expedited Deportation Powers of DHS, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017), http://wapo.st/2t0phNX
[https://perma.cc/GR6H-KL9D].
290 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, David E. Sanger & Maggie Haberman, Trump to Order Mexican
Border Wall and Curtail Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2kqTEIA
[https://perma.cc/J4P3-DPR2].
291 A growing literature documents the fear or “chilling effects” of such measures as the 1996
immigration legislation and ICE’s creation of the Secure Communities program, which deter unauthorized persons and citizens from accessing services for which they are eligible through programs
such as Medicaid, Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
for fear of deportation consequences. See, e.g., Tara Watson, Inside the Refrigerator: Immigration
Enforcement and Chilling in Medicaid Participation, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 313 (2014)
(discussing Medicaid); Francisco I. Pedraza & Ling Zhu, The “Chilling Effect” of America’s New
Immigration Enforcement Regime, PATHWAYS 15–17 (2015) (discussing TANF); Edward D. Vargas
& Maureen A. Pirog, Mixed-Status Families and WIC Uptake: The Effects of Risk of Deportation
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Private citizens and anti-immigrant vigilantes further appear to understand these kinds of official expressions as a directive to perform the
kind of discrimination that has historically been their province. The
Administration’s cues have energized and emboldened such networks,
likely contributing to the nationwide surge in hate crimes and white
supremacist–organized activity in recent years.292
Despite the massive growth of the deportation system, as of 2010,
ICE had the capacity to remove less than 2% of the 22 million
unauthorized persons then present in the United States.293 This circumstance is popularly called the country’s “immigration crisis.” The parameters of the raging national debate it has elicited are set by the poles
of advocacy for mass deportation and mass amnesty. Amidst much intense dispute, there is some consensus that two conditions distinguish
the situation in particular: first, the presence of an excessive number of
deportable people in the country, and second, a corresponding excess of
immigration laws that remain largely unenforced. Most agree, too, that
these conditions are symptomatic of a dysfunctional deportation system.
These same conditions, however, also index the vigorous operation
of self-deportation logic working through the individual deportation system and beyond it. The contemporary individual deportation system
fosters a logic of self-deportation in two principal ways: first, by stripping process to produce opportunities to coerce individuals already
within the deportation system, who may face indefinite detention or the
permanent loss of their children, into agreeing to their removal by the
state; and second, by selectively enforcing deportation laws in especially
harsh and painful ways, to magnify the spectacle of this suffering as a
threat, a deterrence, or a directive to those outside of the system. The
first way, self-deportation within the deportation system, escalates the
total volume of removals and, by reducing costs, expands the capacity
of the formal removal system. However, the second way, the use of the
deportation system to create terror and subordination, may have more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
on Program Use, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 555 (2016) (discussing WIC); Marcella Alsan & Crystal Yang, Fear
and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities 22–26 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 24731, 2018) (discussing food stamps and the ACA).
292 See, e.g., John Eligon, Hate Crimes Increase for the Third Consecutive Year, F.B.I. Reports,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2DlupUZ [https://perma.cc/GN8R-YE7Q]; Joe Heim,
Hate Groups in the U.S. Remain on the Rise, According to New Study, WASH. POST (Feb. 21,
2018), https://wapo.st/2W7mqkc [https://perma.cc/WR5A-QW7F]; Maria Hinojosa, Hate Crimes
Against Latinos Increase in California, NPR (Jul. 15, 2018, 8:18 AM), https://n.pr/2JsFAKD
[https://perma.cc/6AKE-DHK3].
293 See Morton Memo, supra note 258 (stating ICE had resources to remove less than 4% of the
removable population when that population was estimated to be 11.2 million); see also
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 27 (stating that in 2009, ICE
arrested less than 6% of the removable population when that population was estimated to be 11.2
million). However, a Yale study released last year shows that the population has been about twice
as high as previously estimated for decades. See Fazel-Zarandi et al., supra note 258. The researchers’ 95% probability range is between 16.2 million and 29.5 million, with a mean of 22.1 million.
Id. at 2, 10.
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far-reaching effects because of the sheer scale of the population for
whom deportation is now a threat. Indeed, despite the growth of the
deportation system, a century of government acquiescence in private
employers’ creation of incentives to migrate has grown a deportable
population that still exceeds the overall system’s removal capacity to an
extreme extent. This legally fashioned gap — which is steadily being
exacerbated by the federal government’s pursuit of measures to
deauthorize more and more groups of people — raises questions about the
deportation system’s function. Far from obscuring the end of removal, the
government now vigorously brandishes it as the justification for its programs and policies. History, however, instructs us to look past what selfdeportation policy avows to what it accomplishes in the contemporary environment: the subordination of an ever-widening population vulnerable
to exploitation and not desired as a part of the nation’s polity.
III. A NATION SHAPED BY SELF-DEPORTATION
The history of self-deportation imparts a number of lessons that help
us to better understand immigration law and policy in the United States
as a whole. It shows us that the nation’s removal system is not limited
to deportation laws and direct deportations, but rather that the government’s capacity expands by making other entities into agents of selfdeportation policy, especially the individuals it seeks to remove. Doctrines such as preemption and the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition
on subfederal public discrimination have distinguished the roles of subfederal governments, businesses, and private citizens with respect to removal. The policy’s history also indicates that, across historical situations, removal has not comprised an end in itself: rather, governments
have pursued removal as part of other goals — first, control of land,
and, after establishing control of the territory, control of labor. This Part
elaborates on these lessons, with particular attention to how the roles of
different agents and the goals of the policy changed after abolition and
the creation of the individual deportation system. It concludes by assessing
the structural limitations and costs of the policy based on this analysis.
Self-deportation policy expands the government’s capacity by directing the costs of removal away from the government to other entities,
and in particular, to the group that it seeks to remove.294 Further, selfdeportation policy demonstrates that removal policy is not just
government-administered. Private entities, as well as federal and
subfederal agents, create the conditions that cause individuals to selfdeport. In particular, across historical circumstances, governments have
delegated a large role in creating pressures upon the groups they seek to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
294 Cf. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement, supra note 12, at 162 (“[A]ttrition through enforcement possesses a significant advantage over other competing approaches: it is comparatively
inexpensive to implement.”).
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remove to the private sphere. Because private entities, especially
public-facing private entities, interact with the targets of removal policy
on the ground, they hold a great deal of power to make these individuals’ everyday lives — at which the policy aims — unbearable. Thus,
the private citizens who are members of the community in which unauthorized people live — their employers, teachers, service providers,
coworkers, and neighbors, for example — carry out the work of discrimination in ways that range from exclusion to active harassment and private whistleblowing. Self-deportation policy therefore operates through
a penumbra that allocates power to private entities and vigilantes who
are energized by official expressions of anti-immigrant animus, both
federal and subfederal. Furthermore, it works within a landscape
characterized by uneven racial distributions of power and property that
it historically helped to shape. The intimate historical relationship
between self-deportation policy and the production of property
entitlements explains the policy’s power to mobilize communities of
private persons acting in their own interests and pit them against others
whom they perceive to be a threat. The government’s use of spectacle
and expressive statements directed to private citizens suggests that at
least some policymakers understand these motivations and their own
power to draw on this force.
From the period of the early Republic, federal courts have sought to
prohibit states and municipalities from legislating independent
self-deportation regimes. Congress then constitutionalized this principle
against public discrimination with the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court has repeatedly checked subfederal power — by invoking preemption in Indian Affairs against southeastern states’ extension laws, equal
protection against western states’ and municipalities’ Chinese exclusion
laws, and preemption in the field of immigration against the recent
nationwide wave of subfederal self-deportation bills. In each instance
that the Court has limited subfederal attempts to create an independent
removal regime, however, the legislative and executive branches have
then shown that they are responsive to subfederal expressions of agitation by pursuing major ramp-ups to the federal deportation system.295
In particular, the establishment of the individual deportation system
during the era of Chinese exclusion introduced a seismic transformation
to the structure of self-deportation policy by expanding the federal government’s own role. With the creation of the individual deportation
system, the federal government substantially increased its control over
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
295 Thus, as Motomura observes, preemption guards against subfederal discrimination and the
“serious but elusive constitutional violations” state and local governments might commit.
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 115. At the same time, as
Professors David Rubenstein and Pratheepan Gulasekaram observe, “self-deportation, in general” —
and the subordination through which it operates — “is not something that the federal government
disapproves of.” David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 601 n.91 (2017).
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removal and strengthened its formal ability to coordinate the different
actors that have long enacted self-deportation policy under its watch. It
created new opportunities to provoke self-deportation within the deportation system while growing an impressive capacity for direct removal,
bringing diverse forms of removal under its oversight. When governments relied wholly on indirect tactics, they retained no control or
knowledge about how many would stay out or leave, or where they
would go; but when government agents deport someone — whether by
process or lack of it — they regain control over the manner, time, and
geographical coordinates of that person’s removal. Since this development, the federal government has largely limited the subfederal role to
expanding the capacity and reach of the deportation system. It has further systematized this delegation with a wide range of formal
agreements that enlist states’ and municipalities’ aid in apprehending
unauthorized persons.296 Although the role of private citizens in the
deportation system is minimal, the federal government also depends
heavily and increasingly upon private corporations in order to detain
the people it apprehends.297
Perhaps unsurprisingly, from the beginning, the deportation system
has worked to maximize its self-deportation effects. That is, the threat
of a harsh deportation regime has conditioned people’s lives and controlled their behavior, both inside and outside of the deportation system.
Indeed, the relationship between self-deportation and direct deportation
can be summarized as follows: 1) the two removal strategies present
qualitatively distinct alternatives, and 2) the deportation system always
serves a double function, since deportation laws also have a selfdeportation effect. The federal government immediately began to
harness the indirect as well as direct effects of the deportation system,
as demonstrated by the Mexican removal during the Great Depression,
and its evolving deportation policy continues to reflect self-deportation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
296 Such agreements include the Criminal Alien Program, under which federal officers identify
noncitizens in violation of immigration laws by conducting interviews in local jails or prisons; 287(g)
agreements, through which the federal government delegates power to state and local law enforcement to do the same; or the Secure Communities Program, where fingerprints taken by local law
enforcement and received by the FBI are automatically sent to ICE electronically. See Eagly, supra
note 262, at 1184, 1161–62, 1212–14. These measures all increase the state and local role in enforcing federal immigration laws, notwithstanding the qualitative and normative differences of local
immigration law enforcement from federal law enforcement. Id. at 1222–23; Mary Fan, Rebellious
State Crimmigration Enforcement and the Foreign Affairs Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1269, 1270–
73 (2012). Professor Ingrid Eagly has presented extensive evidence showing that even before the
recent subfederal self-deportation legislation, increasing local regulation of immigration was redefining and restructuring the federal system for punishing immigration crime, rather than merely
mirroring it. Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1755–805 (2011).
297 Denise Gilman & Luis A. Romero, Immigration Detention, Inc., 6 J. MIGRATION & HUM.
SECURITY 145, 145 (2018).
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aims. Its decisions, in particular, to create spectacles from the violence
of policies well after their creation and implementation, such as family
separation, denaturalization, and the extreme streamlining of protections within the system, suggest an independent meta-policy — one that
seeks to maximize the reach of the system’s threat. The self-deportation
function of deportation laws therefore allows us to more precisely understand an effect often referred to rather nebulously as a “culture of fear.”
The use of the deportation system for indirect removal may be more
efficacious than its use for direct removals. As discussed above, the
system is technically inadequate for directly removing a population that
is estimated at 22 million people; the biopower and administrative expenses that the individual deportation system requires make it simply
unsuited for a task of this scale.298 While streamlining the process has
greatly magnified its capacity for direct removal, such modifications
cannot cure the inherent structural limitation of the system in proportion
to its target. Without trivializing the violence and escalation of the scale
of the government’s deportations, it is important to recognize that no
escalation or expansion of this system — even with its self-deportation
effects — would be sufficient to remove the entire unauthorized population in the United States. This limitation is further exacerbated by the
fact that the government appears to be prioritizing the growth of this
margin, by continuously deauthorizing additional groups.
However, the history of self-deportation instructs us that selfdeportation policy has worked consistently to achieve an unstated goal
other than removal itself. Discourse about immigration law and policy
focuses almost exclusively on the deportation system and its avowed
purpose of removal and the prevention of unauthorized entry. However,
the development of removal policy after abolition suggests that this focus obscures another consequence of self-deportation policy — controlling noncitizen labor.299 Indeed, the insufficiency of the self-deportation
and deportation systems together to effect removal of all unauthorized
persons in the country, and their effects of subordinating this massive
population instead, suggest that the policy’s function of regulating
foreign labor after abolition and the close of the frontier has flourished
wildly over the last century. As in the past, the mechanism of self–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
298 The federal government, recognizing this incongruity, has periodically granted mass amnesty
to excesses of unauthorized persons in order to bring the system’s capacity in line with its purpose.
See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 66
(1984); see also, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-227, 112
Stat. 2681-538; Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111
Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997); IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Immigration Act of 1924, Pub.
L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
299 In this new function of self-deportation policy, the most significant transformations to the policy’s structure — the establishment of the deportation system — and its aim — subordination —
converge.
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deportation inherently places conditions upon presence: targeted individuals must leave, or submit to subordination and vulnerability to exploitation if they stay.300 Under the modern removal system, the conditional subordination this policy imposes as an alternative to removal
suggests the two outcomes are complementary: the presence of these
individuals may be tolerable or even desirable, as long as they remain
compliant with the policy.301 If we attend to both goals, the government’s increasingly dramatic displays of its deportation power may even
seem to constitute a response to critiques of the discriminatory effects
of its immigration policy. The spectacles of cruelty the government
enacts on deportees emphasize the goal of removal, rather than subordination, in a manner that tends to obstruct our appreciation of the effects of its removal policy on the social fabric of the nation.
To the extent that deportation laws produce results other than
deportation, they produce subordination. It is because the threat of
deportation shapes the contours of people’s everyday lives that, in
Professor Daniel Kanstroom’s words, the system functions “as a labor
control device, a kind of extra tool in the hands of large businesses (and,
for that matter, American families seeking nannies, gardeners, and so
forth) to provide a cheap, flexible, and largely rightless labor supply.”302
Kanstroom here captures the way that subordination, like removal, requires the collective, coordinated efforts of the federal system with
private entities, especially employers across the spectrum of scale, from
major corporations to small businesses and individual families.303 Indeed, legislation that ostensibly seeks to hold employers accountable for
employing unauthorized employees frequently operates to render those
employees even more vulnerable.304 In the current chapter of selfdeportation, the federal government leans particularly heavily on the
deportation system’s capacity to produce fear and a culture of
subordination — thereby increasing the power of private actors vis-àvis individuals, who become less able to access the protections of law
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
300 For scholarship on how the threat of deportation curtails the rights of unauthorized workers,
see Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2183 (1994); and Leticia M. Saucedo, The
Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 968–71 (2006).
301 For scholarship that examines employers’ preferences for workers without status, see Rachel
Bloomekatz, Comment, Rethinking Immigration Status Discrimination and Exploitation in the LowWage Workplace, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1963, 1968–83 (2007); and Saucedo, supra note 300, at 999–1017.
302 KANSTROOM, supra note 164, at 245.
303 See id.
304 For scholarship that addresses the way the IRCA’s employer sanctions have, in practice, burdened employees rather than employers, see Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (2009); and Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus
Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace,
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303 (2010).
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enforcement of any kind.305 The federal government can increase these
effects simply by expanding the population subject to the threat of deportation, not just legislatively, but by unprecedentedly making all deportable people enforcement priorities and by terminating and streamlining protections that have traditionally been available to
unauthorized persons.
Nonetheless, the same aspects of self-deportation that increase the
government’s capacity for removal and subordination also generate critical structural limitations for the tactic. First, the delegation of agency
to the targeted group has significant limits with respect to the goal of
removal. Shifting the cost of removal to deportees means that people of
few means often cannot go far, and they frequently cross state, rather
than national, boundaries. Multiple chapters of the history of selfdeportation instruct us that in order for people to self-deport, they must
have somewhere else to go. In the early nineteenth century, recognizing
this limitation, the government promised tribes alternate lands for their
own and sought to secure lands for emancipated slaves to “colonize.” In
the recent aftermath of subfederal self-deportation bills, evidence shows
that people frequently returned to their homes even after selfdeporting.306 The most efficacious way to promote self-deportation
would be to refrain from making people’s home countries unsafe, unfeasible places to live, to the extent that such external conditions are within
an enacting government’s control. The more dangerous, economically
difficult, and insupportable life elsewhere remains, the less likely people
will be to self-deport, and the more likely it is that the policy’s effects
will stop at its mechanism — subordination.
Additionally, the modern era poses unique challenges to the use of
self-deportation because of the policy’s structural reliance on private actors, over which the government retains little control. Because private
actors must repeat official hostile gestures in countless institutional and
extra-institutional contexts to create self-deportation conditions, the policy will fail to the extent that those private actors do not act in the ways
that the government anticipates. The policy now targets people who
are remarkably integrated in American society and relies on a more diverse polity than ever before, so that the polity’s members may not as
uniformly be willing to assume the role of promoting self-deportation as
in past eras. A government that chooses to pursue a self-deportation
policy likely also counts on the weakness of modern social relations as a
background condition; but where private citizens are willing to provide
significant aid to one another, the policy is likely to fail.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
305 See, e.g., Kartikay Mehrotra et al., In Trump’s America, Bosses Are Accused of Weaponizing
the ICE Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://bloom.bg/2PIvtVb [https://
perma.cc/KAL7-N4YQ] (describing the sharp increase in employers’ abuses of labor with rising
arrest rates of suspected unauthorized persons under the current administration).
306 Benjy Sarlin, How America’s Harshest Immigration Law Failed, MSNBC (May 9, 2014, 3:51
PM), https://on.msnbc.com/18T6dmQ [https://perma.cc/4ZG8-3T7K].
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A government’s choice to shift costs to subfederal entities comes with
similar limitations. States and municipalities whose resources the federal government seeks to marshal for its deportation system may have
different priorities and refuse to accept this role. Indeed, state and local
sanctuary policies are perhaps the most visible and powerful institutional responses to the effects of federal self-deportation. Subfederal
power to refuse this role therefore ensures that the policy can operate
only irregularly across the country, even if the regime is national in
scope. Further, despite their limited role in the federal self-deportation
scheme, subfederal entities also retain powers of official expression that
can directly counter official expressions of hostility, in keeping with the
welcoming role that is traditionally their province.307
A clear assessment of self-deportation’s limitations and costs should
motivate governmental, institutional, and private responses to U.S.
immigration policy. Because the policy interpellates such a broad range
of actors, the costs of self-deportation are high for everyone, economically,308 socially, and politically. When a government shifts the costs of
removal to the group it targets, departing individuals are forced to abandon the lives they have built in this country, sometimes over many
decades. The policy also has more than a material impact on selfdeportees, which is further exacerbated by its impact on their families
and immediate communities, who may face removal or economic
ruin.309 Further, private and institutional actors frequently rely on racial heuristics to do the work of discrimination, which means they target
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
307
308

MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3; Rodríguez, supra note 234.
The immediate outflux of large numbers of Latino workers after the passage of H.B. 56 devastated poultry and agricultural industries, helping make Alabama “the worst economy in the
Southeast.” Benjamin D. Galloway, Casenote, The Beginning of the End: United States v. Alabama
and the Doctrine of Self-Deportation, 64 MERCER L. REV. 1093, 1106 (2013) (quoting Joey
Kennedy, Alabama Has the Worst Economy in the Southeast. Wonder Why?, AL.COM (Oct. 25,
2012, 12:17 PM), http://blog.al.com/jkennedy/2012/10/alabama_has_the_worst_economy.html
[https://perma.cc/T8AB-V92W]); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ANTI-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES HAVE REAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COSTS FOR CITIES THAT ENACT THEM:
A SURVEY OF THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT MEASURES, (2009),
http://observatoriocolef.org/_admin/documentos/costofantiimmig.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDA6-RXXG].
Cities that passed such legislation, moreover, incurred millions of dollars in litigation costs to defend
them. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Hazleton Immigration Ordinance that Began
with a Bang Goes out with a Whimper, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Mar. 28, 2014), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hazleton-immigration-ordinance-began-bang-goes-out-whimper
[https://perma.cc/N3DH-UASY]; Jon Mcclure, Farmers Branch Settles Last Part of Lawsuit over
Rental Ordinance for $1.4 Million, DALL. NEWS (June 2014), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/farmers-branch/2014/06/03/farmers-branch-settles-last-part-of-lawsuit-over-rental-ordinancefor-1.4-million [https://perma.cc/UR3Q-3ZTN].
309 The human costs of family separations, inability to report crimes, and limitations on mobility
are especially high for women, who are more vulnerable to exploitation at home and in the workplace. See, e.g., Jorge R. Fragoso, Comment, The Human Cost of Self-Deportation: How Attrition
Through Enforcement Affects Immigrant Women and Children, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 69,
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a group far larger than the actual unauthorized population in the United
States.310 The subordination of a major part of the national population
creates public health hazards in many respects, including ubiquitous
violence that stems from racial division and vigilante activity. The
government’s reliance on these tools for maintaining the economy destroys the possibility of the peaceful enjoyment of life for all. This bleak
situation, however, is one in which all actors with a role in the removal
system have a stake, and is one which they can also affect. States,
localities, and private actors can counter this policy by working to make
life more viable for communities at whom the laws are aimed, in ways
that neutralize their harm.
Finally, because self-deportation policy operates indirectly and diffusely, it presents issues of transparency and rule of law, as indirect regulation is more likely to do than direct forms of regulation in general.
The pervasive degree to which the policy has escaped comprehensive
description and analysis makes the extent of the power it has drawn
from its own obscurity an open question. It appears, however, that a
government that relies significantly on a policy designed to shift both
expense and control away from it wagers much on the general
population’s ignorance about this choice. It will stake a great deal on a
policy whose effectiveness is largely predicated on a lack of public understanding of what the policy is and how it works. By choosing to
work through self-deportation, a government delegates away the power
to decide the policy’s effectiveness, which hinges on whether or not subfederal entities and private citizens will become agents of removal and
subordination. With respect to the outcomes of its immigration system,
it leaves the public with significant room to call its bluff.
CONCLUSION
This historical account of self-deportation explains how its evolution
has shaped the policy’s present dimensions and illuminates its current
role in the larger U.S. immigration system. Under this indirect mode of
regulation, one common logic mobilizes a range of different kinds of
laws, including civil, criminal, immigration, alienage, and public benefits laws: the idea that people can be made to remove themselves by
attacking different aspects of people’s everyday lives. The basic elements of this attack include targeting their ability to keep their families
together, access the protections of the legal system, move through public
space without fear of public or private violence, and obtain shelter, employment, healthcare, and education. Today, this indirect policy serves
two functions, although one tends to overshadow the other: removal and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
82 (2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration
Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1545–58 (1995).
310 Professor Kevin Johnson has long argued that anti-immigrant sentiment both impacts minority citizens and shapes immigration law and policy. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 244, at 948–49.
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control of labor. Since its mechanism subordinates its target group
relative to other members of the polity, self-deportation policy places
conditions upon presence. Individuals can submit to the vulnerability
imposed upon them, or leave.
Colonial governments’ recognition that it was not necessary to use
direct methods to effect the removal of native peoples from the lands
they coveted imparted a searing lesson for removal policy in the United
States. Even after the creation of a federal system for direct removal,
the use of this system was still framed by the recognition that indirect
methods were a powerful tool. Self-deportation policy in the modern
era is consequently a palimpsest: contemporary state and municipal
attempts to pass independent self-deportation legislation echo past chapters of its life, while the evolving deportation system continues to transform self-deportation policy in new directions.
This cycle has
produced its growth: repeatedly, courts have found subfederal selfdeportation legislation preempted, and repeatedly, the legislative and
executive branches have responded by exercising their supremacy in the
domain of removal to dramatically escalate direct deportations.
The federal government coordinates its own actions with those of
subfederal and private entities to enact this policy. Most visibly, it directs deportation policy to achieve removal and labor control at once; it
partners with private corporations and enlists states’ and municipalities’
aid to expand capacity of the deportation system. This system further
operates within a broader climate also shaped by the federal government’s coordination. Most importantly, the federal government, with
help from states and municipalities, delegates discrimination to private
entities, who are best positioned to perform it because they interact with
people in the register that the policy attacks — their everyday lives.
These delegations to public and private entities, however, shift control
away from the federal government, along with costs, rendering the policy susceptible to failure on its own terms in the event that their interests
become misaligned and its partners refuse to cooperate.
Understanding the individual deportation system as a host for selfdeportation policy clarifies the logic behind some of its most controversial characteristics — the government’s spectacles of cruelty, and its continued expansion of an unauthorized population already exceeding
22 million people, along with an already bloated, mostly unenforced immigration code. These features are symptoms of more than a dysfunctional deportation system: they index the vibrancy of self-deportation
logic as it operates through the deportation system today. Far from a
marginal, recent experiment with alternatives to the more loudly contested issue of direct deportation, self-deportation policy both animates
the individual deportation system and shapes the context in which its
indirect effects work. Without seeing how direct and indirect strands of
removal policy developed together and in relation to one another, it is
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not possible to understand the dynamics and scope of the immigration
system as a whole.

